THE ART OF THE ORATOR

BY

EDGAR R. JONES, M.P.

WITH A FOREWORD

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THE RIGHT HON. D. LLOYD GEORGE, M.P.

LONDON
ADAM AND CHARLES BLACK
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

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FOREWORD

I once heard Mr. Gladstone say, that in a conflict between the platform and the press for the direction of public opinion in this country, an efficient platform would surely win. Whether that be so or not, the influence of the spoken word must always be great in the government of all democratic communities, and in every sphere of activity, however exalted, it must continue to inspire men, and fashion their lives. Every aid to the efficient discharge of so important a function must be welcome. The experience and skill acquired by Mr. Edgar Jones in the practice of this great art gives value to a contribution from his pen on the subject. His original and ingenious treatment of it makes it well worth perusal by all those who wish to acquire proficiency in the art of public speaking.

D. LLOYD GEORGE.

PREFACE

It is with some apprehension that a public man ventures to publish a volume on oratory under his own name; he obviously lays himself open to taunts and to accusations of presumption.

But it is not in the capacity of a practitioner that I have approached the subject. If there is anything due to experience in the book, it is an experience of failure and a poignant recollection of mistakes.

In my college days I combined a study of mental and moral science with that of pedagogy, and years ago it struck me as peculiar that there should be a whole library of textbooks that endeavoured to base ideal methods of teaching a class on the principles of mental activity found in the treatises on psychology; whereas, so far as I knew, no similar scientific attempt had been made during recent years to

base the methods of addressing an audience on the laws of psychology.

The properly trained pedagogue starts from the question, "How does the child begin to acquire ideas?" Why should not the orator begin with the parallel question, "How does the mind of an adult acquire an idea?" As a humble student, wondering what the pursuit would yield, I took up some of my old pedagogic textbooks, and then settled down to a feeble imitation.

As the reader will observe, I borrowed the psychology from the standard textbooks, and mainly from those I was most acquainted with. I have quoted largely because there may be many readers who are not acquainted with, and may never become acquainted with, psychological treatises.

I have merely patched things together. It may be fairly readable for the ordinary reader, if he takes time and tries to pick up the technical terms as he goes along. For the expert it will serve as an indication of what may be done along these lines. It is only a first attempt; and if it may serve as a basis for lectures in some of our institutions, such as

theological colleges, and lead to a development similar to that in pedagogy, the volume will have served its purpose.

They are notes for reflection, illustration, and expansion. Later on, if leisure permits, I may fill out the outline with explanation and illustration.

Having used psychology for guidance as to procedure before the audience, I turned to logic for light as to preparation, and found some illuminative and helpful passages in Mill and a few other authors.

For those who had not, as boys have nowadays, systematic school instruction in the theory of composition, I have added the notes I used in my old lecturing days. The order taken, therefore, is found in three successive questions: (1) How can I move the audience in the direction I desire? (2) How should I prepare my matter when endeavouring to achieve that result? (3) How should I arrange my words, phrases, and sentences, in the exposition of that matter? I have blundered through the whole in a spirit of inquiry, and remain a timorous student on the threshold of a great subject.

One objection is sure to be raised—the hackneyed conservative objection that theory is of no use, because the orator is born such, or made such by practice. That applies to the theory underlying every art, and has no weight with anyone of consequence. The bearing of theory on practice is dealt with in the text.

The author's hope is that the theory underlying the art of the orator may soon receive much more attention than it has received up to the present.

EDGAR R. JONES.

March 25, 1912.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

CHAPTER II

CHAPTER III

CHAPTER IV

CHAPTER V

CHAPTER VI

THE ART OF THE ORATOR

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

THE orator was in ancient times a greater man than the warrior. By his skill the city or tribe was roused to war or persuaded to peace. Knowledge was spread, Christianity was established, almost entirely by the spoken word. The Bible was not extensively read by the masses of the people until the seventeenth century, and news was not widely disseminated by weekly or daily journals until the eighteenth century. The talker was the medium for conveying information of all kinds. To-day the writers and printers surpass the talkers in many ways. Children in school learn from books and papers. There are lessons through the post; sermons, political speeches, and lectures, can be read a few hours after they are de-

Effect of printing on oratory.

livered. News of events, descriptions of enterprise, scientific discoveries, developments of knowledge, and affairs of State, reach the remotest hamlet and the feeblest invalid. But in spite of all these developments, the written word has not lessened the demand for the spoken word. The speaker is necessary whenever something has to be driven home. The teacher has to be trained in the art of assisting the child to deal with the printed lessons; the preacher is trained to drive the written truth into effective contact with the hearts of men; the significance of news, and progress, and effort, has to be impressed upon the mind by the living voice and features of a competent speaker. So we find that there is more scope for the art of the orator to-day than ever before, and those who become intelligent, well-informed readers of the various productions of the Press swell the audiences that are gathered together by the charm of eloquence.

A new type of eloquence.

It is not the same type of eloquence as that of ancient days. The ancient orator had to deal with audiences who knew little of the details of the subject. He had to supply the

information in as simple and minute and patient a way as he could devise. Now, on most subjects, the audiences are well informed concerning the mass of details. The speaker can assume the existence of a certain "mental content" in his hearers, and can therefore concentrate more directly on his arguments or generalizations. One is tempted to say that therefore the standard of speaking has been raised; but on reflection one recognizes that that is not the exact way to put it. To overcome, as Demosthenes did, the limited knowledge of the citizens who had never been outside the walls of Athens, and to succeed in leading their thoughts from fact to principle, and from principle to judgment, on great and difficult issues; to be so skilful as Cicero was in converting the crude prejudices of Roman senators into great moral principles that moved to action; to be so graphic and pictorial as Hugh Latimer for the purpose of giving ignorant, material-minded mediævals a clear idea of Christian doctrine—those were achievements that must for ever remain in the records of oratory as unsurpassable triumphs of genius. The modern speaker has new advan-

tages and new difficulties. He may perform his task as successfully as the ancients did theirs, but, because the task is a different one, we cannot compare the standards; hence we must not say that the standard has been raised, but that it has been changed.

Modern neglect in teaching oratory.

There is one respect in which we compare unfavourably with the ancients. They studied the art of public speech seriously, and they taught it systematically in their academies; but we do not provide regular instruction in many of our colleges or schools. Surely this is a remarkable state of things. Our secondary schools and colleges send out thousands of youths with a general education that enables them to enter with a certain amount of confidence into most of the general activities of life, but with a lamentable lack of confidence, due to lack of training, in the art of persuading their fellows. That this is a misfortune in a democratic age everyone must admit. Men and women are now organized in social classes and industrial tribes. Every village, and church, and chapel, has its circles, and guilds, and societies; every industry has its association of employers, and its trade union; every pro-

fession has its council or union. The most skilful speaker inevitably becomes the leader, and if his influence is a bad one he moves the mass along the undesirable road. Next to the acquirement of the manual or business skill that wins a livelihood, the capacity to enlighten and to influence by speech stands as the most important in the modern State.

Several colleges and schools devote their energies to much less fruitful studies than the rhetorical art. English reading, composition, poetry, mental and moral science, and many other studies, might be co-ordinated, and be worked in as part of a scheme of rhetoric. But the claims of the art must be pressed further than that. There should be lectures and demonstrations similar to those that have been gradually developed in the colleges for training teachers; and then, as has happened in education, a library of specialized treatises will be built up until there has been established something like a scientific treatment of method and aim. This volume attempts, as a modest beginning, to treat the problem of the speaker and the audience as educational textbooks have treated that of the teacher and the class. In

Object of this book.

doing so, the model of the teachers' handbooks will be sometimes closely followed, and the scientific bases will be similarly dealt with.

Theory and practice.

But at the outset there arises the same question as has to be answered by the educationist: What is the bearing of theory upon practice? Is not the great orator born, and not made? The evidence of experience is dead against the idea that an orator is such by nature alone. Demosthenes and many, if not most, of the greatest orators of the ages had to practise hard, and struggle for years against natural defects. Of course there was a natural aptitude and tendency to be eloquent in those men; but without practice and opportunity, and circumstances to develop their inherent quality, they would not have become masters of the crowd. It was practice combined with a sound instinct that fashioned their oratory.

It is only the genius, the exceptional man of a generation, whose instincts are beyond rules and conventions. The average man of talent wants more than indiscriminate practice. Indeed, the pulpits and public places of to-day are filled with men who have stereotyped wrong

methods, bad manner, and unbearable defects. Theory can help here. Its function may be made clear by analogy with the relation of the science of astronomy to the art of navigation. Why should the sailor have to study the principles underlying the art? The principles do not enable him to manage a ship, neither does the most detailed knowledge of nautical almanacs, charts, etc. So it can be said that the mere study of theoretical principles will not enable an author to write or an orator to speak with facility. Ships were sailed, and speeches were successful, long before there was any study of principles. But the knowledge that the sailor acquires enables him to sail his ship much more successfully than he could without that knowledge. It enables him (1) to get more directly to his destination; (2) to know the location of rocks, shallows, currents, etc., and to avoid them; (3) to get along with the confidence bred of intelligence. Similarly, the study of principles enables the writer and speaker (1) to convey his thoughts to others with greater cogency and directness; (2) to avoid errors of grammar, style, and manner; (3) to have confidence. The essential

importance of these will be brought out later. The creation of confidence is a condition of success for the orator. There is, of course, a confidence that arises from temperament and from constant practice, and can only come with practice. But that is a blustering confidence, which is often more conducive to the development of an insufferable bore than an attractive orator. The confidence that leads to power is that of the man who has had enough practice to know what he can do, and is in addition conscious that he is conversant with the high canons of the art, and conscious of the intellectual quality of his ideas and of the logical cogency of his argument. Confidence of such a character has a remarkably subtle effect on an audience, and later on the nature of the effect will be analyzed.

CHAPTER II

THE PROBLEM

Most modern books that deal with the subject give admirable advice to the speaker. He is told how to manage the voice, how to hold his hands, how to practise elocutionary exercises and gesture. He is in some books advised to practise before a full-length mirror. All this counsel is helpful in its way. But the proper thing for anyone who wishes to perfect his vocal mechanism, or to correct defective gesture is to go to a teacher of elocution for practical exercises under supervision. The average man or woman has no need to do that. If a person has been properly taught in school to read and speak distinctly, and to produce voice properly, he requires no further training; and the school during early years, when learning the alphabet and syllables, is

Secondary matters.

the place where enunciation and articulation should be properly acquired.

Fallacy of subjective methods.

There is a fatal error in thinking that one can cultivate the art of the orator by cultivating oneself. There is a fallacy in such a subjective treatment of the art that leads to failure. Elaborate elocutionary exercises, in so far as they improve the strength, or pliability, or distinctness, of the voice, or in so far as they remove eccentricities or defects of manner, are certainly good ; but if the speaker produces his voice, and varies his expression, and moves his arms, and adjusts his features, according to premeditated ideas, then failure will probably follow.

Contrast between actors and speakers.

Such premeditation is essential for the reciter or the actor. His task is to interpret a work of art. He has to intensify passion, heighten imagination, and elevate Nature by the charm of Art. You expect a tone and movement of voice, and an original dramatic attitude of body, different from the commonplace manner of the street. You lay yourself out for an imaginative, unreal, make-believe performance. You know that the passion is artificial. But so long as your mood is

satisfied by the idealistic representation, you are captivated by the art of the reciter or actor. There is no need to pursue the subject of dramatic realism and idealism, and of the exact relation between the natural and the artistic; our purpose is served, so far as actors are concerned, by a rough statement such as the above.

The task of the speaker is very different from that of the reciter and actor. The speaker has to be above everything else natural and real. He has not to deal with the subjective consideration of how to represent through his voice and manner the conceptions and emotions arranged by the poet or dramatist; he has to deal with an objective consideration; he has to study the mind and emotions of an audience, and has to discover how to work upon them so as to produce a given effect. The actor's art is representative; but the orator's is creative, like that of the dramatist.

Many speakers are spoiled by studying and practising their art from the subjective instead of from the objective point of view. They manage their voice and their movement to

satisfy themselves, and thus carry a trace of artificiality and unreality which is fatal with most audiences.

Two types of preachers.

This matter is very serious and important for preachers. Of course there may be some preachers whose view of their purpose is that they should compose a sermon which is an idealistic expression of spiritual things, just as a poem or drama is composed by the dramatist ; and that they should then deliver that composition as the actor delivers his piece. Those who hold that view may be classed with the actors for elocutionary purposes. This book deals with the preacher who is engaged in the practical task of directly influencing the conduct of men and women from day to day. Such a preacher has a message to deliver, as a man to other men. If there is any suggestion of artificiality or unreality about his delivery, then his message lacks its proper effect. Half the bad preaching of the country is due to the self-consciousness of preachers, who are talking to the looking-glass, who have practised tones of voice that please their own ears—tones which they regard as cleverly produced, but which sound hollow to the ears of the congregation.

Likewise with gesture or attitude. Any appearance of a studied attempt to look impressive, or to pose well, or to be dramatic, detracts from the effect. A speaker may at home practise gesture in order to become free from awkward movements, or to make ease and gracefulness natural to gesture; but he should not so practise just before a particular address: otherwise, self-conscious, as he must then be, there will be danger of affectation or artificiality. All raising or sinking of the voice, and all movements of the body, must come naturally and freely, and the audience must feel that they are natural and inevitable. Defects of affectation.

This "inevitableness" in the relation of form to matter is the secret of style in poetry and the gift of genius. Many critics, while recognizing the "inevitable" character of the rhythm and rhyme of certain poems, have found some difficulty in analyzing this vague epithet "inevitable" into definite parts and features. Irregular versification like Shelley's confounds him who looks for the secret in the formal rules of prosody. The effect of the long-breathed blank-verse periods of

The value of pause.

Milton cannot be explained by the rules that permit an admiration of Dryden's heroics.

Perhaps the secret lies in "pause," and the variety that pause makes in the rhythmic beats. Anyone reading one of the great masterpieces of poetry can produce astonishing effects by a skilful use of pause and beat, without raising or lowering the pitch of voice very much.

The "inevitableness" that is essential in the sphere of oratory lies in an alternation of pause and beat. Let any person try to deliver a fragment from one of the classic speeches of Bright in an ordinary conversational style, after a careful study of "pause" and "rhythmic beat," and he will see how unnecessary is any undue lowering or elevation of tone, or artificial trick of gesture, to powerful dramatic effects. The natural modulations and gestures of the person himself, provided they are under judicious control, combined with the movement that makes the sentences come forth as part of himself—those are the fundamental elements of form. It may of course be possible for the exceptional person, born with the genius for dramatic delivery, to practise elaborate forms, and, like the great actor, make

everyone feel that there is sincerity in every move of an eyelash; but only such a born dramatist can attempt this with safety. If he is a man talking to other men, he must do so with his usual pause, etc., as in reading poetry, with rhythm, voice, and manner, magnified and intensified according to the size and circumstances of the audience. But the fuller discussion of the equipment of the orator must not be anticipated. The matter that is being emphasized here is the danger that lies in the subjective point of view.

Preparation of notes.

This has a bad effect in other ways than those sketched above. Detailed and extensive suggestions are given in some publications as to methods of preparation—whether loose notes are better than copybooks, whether typewritten papers are best; how to memorize, how to invent mnemonics, and how to use various devices. Such hints certainly have some value, but some of them are trivial, and the practice of speakers varies considerably. Methods of sketching outlines and memorizing are taken in the schools where English and composition are properly taught. The higher questions affecting preparation are

discussed below. The mistake made by many speakers is that of adopting a method for its own sake. Too many sermons and speeches are drafted, according to a system that looks well on paper and satisfies the composer's eye. Compositions are written, and the writer's critical judgment is the sole criterion; then these compositions are hopeless failures in the pulpit or on the platform. Phillips Brooks has put the point clearly for the preacher: "Whatever is in the sermon must be in the preacher first; clearness, logicalness, vivacity, earnestness, sweetness, and light, must be personal qualities in him before they are qualities of thought and language in what he utters to his people." And again: "Men used to talk of 'sermonizing.' They said that some good preacher was a fine 'sermonizer.' The word contained just this vice: it made a sermon an achievement to be attempted and enjoyed for itself apart from anything that it could do, like a picture or an oratorio, like the Venus of Milo or the 'Midsummer Night's Dream.'"

The point to understand is that in preparation, as in delivery, one has to have the

audience, and the purpose to be achieved, before the mind. The task must be approached from the objective, not the subjective, point of view. The question that arises may be put thus: Here is an audience that has to be made like clay in the hands of the potter. How is such a mastery to be obtained? Some have done it by carefully-written addresses read out word by word, or memorized and delivered with effect. Some have succeeded by trusting to the word-inspiration of the moment. Some have used full notes, some none at all. Some have had to prepare elaborately; others prepared but scrappily. Some have conquered by rolling periods of Johnsonian strength, some by literary grace; some, like Cromwell, by rugged, jagged phrases blurting out the cruel truth. All of them conquered because they were men in living touch with the circumstances and thought of those to whom they spoke.

Physical characteristics.

Some of them had the assistance of a fine appearance and wonderful voice, like Pitt and Gladstone; but most of them laboured under serious physical disadvantages in this respect. Demosthenes was a stammerer with a painful

husky defect of voice. Hooker's voice was weak, and his mannerisms were painful. The younger Pitt's voice sounded as if he spoke through a muffler. Curran was a stutterer. Sheil squealed. Gladstone's description of Newman, one of the most influential of pulpit orators in history (quoted by Holyoake), gives in a definite, concrete form the whole case we are now considering:

"Dr. Newman's manner in the pulpit was one which, if you considered it in its separate parts, would lead you to arrive at a very unsatisfactory conclusion. There was not very much change in the inflection of his voice; action there was none; his sermons were read, and his eyes were always on his book; and all that, you will say, is against efficiency in preaching. Yes; but you take the man as a whole, and there was a stamp and a seal upon him, there was a solemn music and sweetness in his tone, there was a completeness in the figure, taken together with the tone and with the manner, which made even his delivery such as I have described it, and though exclusively with written sermons, singularly attractive."

The meaning of the example is that successful oratory does not, after all, depend upon the physical or other accompaniments. All these things are secondary and accidental. Of course, a good voice and a fine appearance help to a considerable extent : but they are not essential. Success is based upon great fundamental psychological and ethical principles. The structure of the human brain and the mysteries of the human heart are at the bottom of everything. He who understands human nature, and how to work upon it, becomes the master in spite of vocal or bodily defects. The genius has instinct to guide him : let the average man seek guidance from knowledge

What is the problem that the orator has to solve ? Campbell affirms that he has to do one or more of the following things : Campbell's analysis.

1. Enlighten the understanding.
2. Please the imagination.
3. Move the passions.
4. Influence the will.

The conditions underlying each of those problems must form the subject of any inquiry into

the scientific bases of the art of oratory, and those conditions must be considered in relation to different types of audiences and different sets of circumstances.

CHAPTER III

THE SCIENTIFIC BASES

I. Presentation.

It is obvious that a speaker has first of all to be clearly, rightly, and immediately understood. The rules of composition that must be observed for that purpose are dealt with in Chapter V. But there are a few elementary facts of psychology relating to mental conditions and processes which the speaker must pay attention to. Indeed, the serious student of the art of oratory should carefully study a good manual of psychology, and look out, as he does so, for the light that is thrown upon the art.

It will be sufficient here to note the main points that bear most directly on our subject. The speaker's task would be fairly simple if the mind of the audience, which is the material

How the mind acquires an idea.

he has to work upon, were unformed and passive, like the marble of the sculptor; or, to put it in another way, if the mind of each hearer were a *tabula rasa*, like a sheet of white paper upon which certain ideas had to be written. Locke, the philosopher, assumed that that was the mental condition of childhood, but the theory has long ago been abandoned. We have to start with the clearly established principle that the mind, even of the child, has a certain "content," and that the minds of those to whom a speech is made differ from one another in the nature of this "mental content." But we are using now a technical phrase that may not be understood. Let us see how the mind acquires an idea. We cannot do better than quote Professor Ward's illustration of the process: "Suppose that in a few minutes we take half a dozen glances at a strange and curious flower. At first only the general outline is noted; next the disposition of petals, stamens, etc.; then the attachment of the anthers, form of the ovary, and so on: that is to say, symbolizing the whole flower as $p'\ (ab)\ s'\ (cd)\ o'\ (xy)$, we first apprehend, say, $(p' \ldots s' \ldots o')$, then $p'\ (ab)\ s'\ (\ldots)\ o'\ (\ldots)$,

or p' $(a \ldots)$ s' $(c \ldots)$ o' $(x \ldots)$, and so forth."

Discrimination and assimilation.

The first glance was but a vague, undefined outline, consisting of one or two broad outstanding features. At the second glance some additional details were filled in, and at every further glance more details. The first vague outline makes it possible for us to *discriminate* certain details. These become *assimilated* to the outline already in consciousness, and thus a newer and fuller outline is formed. This new outline makes it possible for us to discriminate further details; these in turn become assimilated. A still fuller outline results, which leads to further discrimination and assimilation. This capacity for the differentiation of particulars, and a consequent advance in knowledge based upon the knowledge already acquired, explains why the expert botanist sees so much more when examining a simple flower than the ordinary unobservant, untrained person.

The general laws of consciousness are typified by the above process. In Professor Ward's words: "The whole field of consciousness would thus, like a continually growing picture,

increase indefinitely in complexity of pattern, the earlier presentations not disappearing, like the waves of yesterday in the calm of to-day, but rather lasting on, like old scars that show beneath new ones." Now, perhaps, the meaning of the "mental content" is clear. There is a background of ideas in the mind of every member of the audience. The capacity of the audience to understand an address on a subject depends upon that background, and the speaker must never forget that. What does the audience know about this? What does the audience know about a subject allied to this, which I can use as an illustration? What is the general intelligence of the audience? What is the mental atmosphere in which the audience lives? What do they think and talk about during the months and weeks? What "mental content" is there? Those are the questions that must be present to the mind of the speaker who wants to be understood. Many are the good tales amongst parish politicians of the noble Earl or the famous barrister from London who spoke to the rustic mind with as much effect as to the beams and rafters. Very funny are the jokes amongst

Questions for the speaker.

preachers, of the great city man who sent all the country-folk to sleep. Men have no business to take the thought and phrases of the town circle to the village circle, which is made of different thoughts and phrases. The great orator adapts himself to every circle; he discovers the secret of the maze, and gets to its centre, while others wander aimless and lost in the outer passages.

Wrong arrangement of details.

It is not only the general mental content which is of such importance, but the process of the presentation of new ideas to that already existing state of consciousness is equally important. The mutual working of the processes of discrimination and assimilation must determine the procedure of the speaker. Failure after failure is due solely to a disregard of this fundamental process of the mind. Speakers begin with the details—details that are very valuable, that are intrinsically of great interest to the audience. They pile them on, one after the other, until the attention of the audience is entirely lost, and a speech which has cost months of hard and clever original work has a most disappointing effect. The fault is not in the audience; the speaker has proceeded

contrary to the natural laws of thought, with the natural consequences of so doing.

If the reader will consider once more the symbolic outline given above, he will see what the natural method should be. The essence of it is system. Promiscuous, badly-arranged facts or arguments cannot be grasped by the mind without difficulty. There are speakers who are very systematic, but their system is a false one. Some, for instance, have an idea that it is dramatic to keep back the purpose of the discourse until it emerges with a surprise at the end. Of course, such a device may do for three to five minutes, but to go on for fifteen or thirty minutes with an audience wondering what you are driving at is fatal.

The natural pyscho-logical order.

In a proper psychological scheme, a broad outline of the subject would be given first of all; then a bare statement of the aim of the address would follow, with a hint of its divisions, and how part dovetails into part. That is the proper procedure, which accords with the movements of the mind. Like the example of the flower symbolized by Professor Ward, the audience at first glance, as it were, should see the main feature in broad outline; then

each act of attention to the speaker should fill in the outline steadily and regularly, each assimilation of ideas making discrimination possible and easy, and that in turn enabling further assimilation to take place. The building up of an address on right lines is, therefore, not analogous to the spectator's sight of the building of a house in the old style, starting from the bottom and putting brick on brick; but rather to what the spectator sees in the newer style, where the whole framwork of steel is first erected complete, and the bricks are filled into the frame. But the better illustration of the process is that of the making of a picture, given by Professor Ward, or it may be developed on the analogy of a water-colour picture. The artist in water-colour covers his paper or board with a first wash of colour as the background of his picture. Then he washes part with the next faint colour that comes into the picture. Then on top of that, in parts, another colour, and another, until detail begins to form, and smaller and smaller details are put on, colour upon colour, until the picture is complete.

What a gain to audience and to speaker

The graphic style.

would it be if the latter always proceeded with the conscious intention of painting his subject on the minds of his hearers like a picture! It would certainly do no harm. The graphic style is always very successful, and it would certainly train the speaker to proceed according to the canons of his art as they are being laid down here. He would be very careful, when he came to difficult details, to go deftly and slowly and patiently, like the artist when using his smallest brush, giving time for the assimilation of one thing before expecting the discrimination of another, letting the one colour dry before putting on the next.

The speaker who pursues this course acquires in time the faculty of being able to project himself into the mind of the hearer: he is able to watch the subject grow on the audience, as the artist watches his on the paper. He knows when to stop, knows at once if he has made a false move, works with vigilance and skill according as the circumstances demand.

Up to the present only the simplest possible form of conscious processes has been taken, one that rarely occurs in practice in such a

clearly defined way. It is, nevertheless, the form that is the foundation of every process of thought, and it is typical of every process, so it has been rightly used as an illustration of the first elementary principle.

II. Association.

So far, it is only the simple direct presentation of an object to one of the senses that has been dealt with. It is very rarely that only one sense is involved. The Laws of Association are in constant operation.

Example of association.

"Let us suppose that we are looking at the picture on the wall. There it is in what we may call the *focus of vision*. But it suggests certain thoughts which are also present to consciousness, and thus we see dimly the wall on which it hangs, and much besides in what we may call the *margin of vision*. Realize for yourself by actual observation how much you do see indistinctly in this way. Furthermore, though we may pay little attention to them, there are other things present in what we may term the *margin of consciousness*—sounds such as the ticking of the clock and the flicker of the fire flame, scent such as that of the flowers

in the vase, pressure from the position of the body, and that general feeling which we call either 'freshness' or 'fatigue.' We are apt to consider only that on which our attention is specially fixed—that which is in the focus of consciousness—and to neglect the other elements which lie in the margin of consciousness. And I would again urge you to realize for yourself by actual observation, without which you can do nothing of value in psychology, how much there is in the margin of consciousness of which you are not fully conscious, but merely *subconscious.* The first result of our analysis of a state of consciousness is, therefore, the distinction between what is focal and what is merely marginal. It is the focal element to which we attend; indeed, we may say that attention is the clear, accurate, and decisive focussing of the central element in consciousness, or, otherwise stated, that attention differentiates the focus from the margin."*

There are several of the fundamental processes of thought included in the above quotation.

* Professor Lloyd Morgan's "Psychology for Teachers" (Longmans), p. 3.

There is that which makes association and subconsciousness and assimilation and differentiation possible at all—the power of retentiveness. An idea or impression gets *registered*, so to speak, in the mind ; it fades away with the lapse of time, but it is *retained* somehow. It is not necessary here to ask how it is retained, and if it were necessary no one could explain at present ; it is one of the mysteries of science. Everything depends upon this power of retention, and the person in whom it is impaired is one of the most pathetic spectacles in the world. Apparently the loss of the power is due to physiological causes, and is a matter for medical science. Retentiveness.

There is a common mistake that may be mentioned here. Books and methods are advertised that profess to give men a system which improves the memory. Speakers who have a difficulty in learning a sermon or written speech, or in remembering the points of an address, may be tempted to spend time in endeavouring to cultivate some such system. It is desirable therefore to understand clearly that the power of retention as such is not dependent upon the method and arrangement Memory systems.

of ideas. If impressions and ideas come higgledy-piggledy, they are retained quite as surely as the well-ordered presentations; the intensity with which they are registered depended mainly on physiological conditions and on the general health. Impressions are naturally more faint when we are very tired, or half asleep, or indifferent to what is going on. The advantage in connection with ideas acquired systematically comes when we wish to reproduce them. It is not the power of retention that varies so much, but the power of recall. Ideas retained in a loose, disconnected way are difficult to recall.

Conditions of recall.

Now, the conditions of the reproduction of what the mind has registered are sometimes very simple, and sometimes very complex and artificial. The simple natural process of remembering without effort is governed by the Laws of Association. If two impressions or ideas come together into the focus of consciousness, then subsequently, when one comes, the other comes also. We see a certain bird, and we remember its note, or we hear the note and remember the appearance of the bird. The *association links* are very important factors in

Links of association.

mental processes. We get into the habit, when one thing happens, to *expect* another which has been associated with it in the past.

These psychological principles are of immense importance, not only for the speaker's own training in preparing and delivering addresses, but for the speaker's consideration in dealing with his audiences. He would find it very interesting and profitable to read a full exposition of these "laws" in some of the standard manuals of psychology. A bare indication of their names must suffice here. The "association" takes place at the moment of registration. The links of association are retained with the retention of the impressions or ideas; so that, when a sound is recalled, an associated colour, or shape, or taste, or touch, is also recalled. Further than that, not merely two or three impressions or ideas, but a whole range of general consciousness, with the undefined margin, is recalled. Let us return for a moment to the illustration of the picture on the wall. The point of the illustration was that the apparently simple act of looking at a picture on a wall was not a simple act at all. There was a whole field of consciousness affect-

ing smell, touch, sound, and complications with the mental content, and various association links. But there was an act of attention which gave a focus, around which the field radiated outwards in decreasing intensity. Those were the conditions of presentation to consciousness, and the new point to be grasped now is that those will also be the conditions of recall. If the occasion is reproduced, it will be reproduced as it was retained. The focus on presentation will be the focus in representation. That which is attended to is more clearly reproduced than that which is not attended to, but it is reproduced with the margin.

The margin and background give a setting of interest and sympathy to the new associations, and the speaker who arouses that interest or sympathy finds it much easier to get into touch with associations that will readily appeal to the mind of the hearer.

The significance of these laws of association for the speaker's purpose is that things can often be made clear by a suggestion which links on by association to some existing knowledge or interest which could not be explained

in any other way. That is why poetry is more valuable than prose. The great poet through images and figures of speech, by means of suggestion, can find expression for emotions, and handle subjects of thought and passion that cannot be expressed in cold matter-of-fact prose. Prose that aims at logical relevancy and a purely intellectual appeal is limited in its scope, but the poet can work upon the whole unlimited field of consciousness, with its endless possibility of effective combinations and associations. The sphere of logical interest is very limited, but the general interests that are bound up by the innumerable links of association are wonderful in extent and variety.

Use of suggestion.

It is upon these interests that art in every form can work. The poet plays upon them with magical effect. So does the great orator, the man who moves the masses to tremendous revolution. It is not syllogisms that rouse a nation to action, but figures of speech. These and the emotional aspect are dealt with later, and examples may be found in psychological textbooks of the different ways of moving the mind by association, and suggestion by resemblance, similarity, contiguity, and contrast.

III. Attention.

At this stage the effect of the processes of association on attention needs to be noticed. There are different kinds of attention.

(1) *Immediate or Primitive Attention.*—When the object of attention is interesting in itself, and does not derive its interest from other objects with which it has been associated. Attention is in these cases involuntary, and without any sense of effort; it is passive, a mere natural response to the impulse, like the withdrawal of a finger which is pricked.

(2) *Derived or Apperceptive Attention.*—When the object of attention is interesting because of something else with which it is associated. This form of attention may be *involuntary*, where the associations are strong enough to arouse attention; or it may be *voluntary*, where there is some active effort to attend.

(3) *Passive Voluntary Attention.*—Where one has got into the habit of attending, until there is no sense of effort, in spite of the fact that one is actively engaged, perhaps with some strain in giving the attention.

The form (1) hardly ever enters into the relations between speaker and hearer. The involuntary form of (2) is given to the speaker when the audience is interested because of the occasion or circumstances. There are times when an audience hangs upon the words of the poorest of speakers on the driest of subjects. The syllables of kings are like the thunderbolts of peasants. Such attention roused because of the associations does not call for the serious exercise of the orator's art. The only remark necessary to make is that a distinguished orator is sometimes less successful under such circumstances than the plain blunt man of clumsy words—because the orator does not carefully consider what the circumstances involve. Whenever attention is vouchsafed, the plainer and more direct and simple the statement, the better. He who strains his power to secure an attention already given for other reasons is doing the wrong thing, and the consequences are sure to be bad. There is, however, one other phase of this case. The orator may regard the occasion, when people are eager to listen to anything he may say, as an opportunity for him to give a great classic oration that satisfies

Effect of circumstances.

the highest canons of his art. A funeral, a commemoration, or some such formal occasion, has always been the chance for the classic oration, and the production of rhetorical style as such. The only problem to be decided is how far the involuntary attention can be counted upon.

Voluntary effort to attend.

Again, when an audience is anxious to know the facts of some subject, *voluntary* effort with a sense of strain can be obtained. This is found in the college lecture-room, the Philosophical Society, classes of all kinds, company meetings, and sometimes in political or other public meetings. But it is very easy to lose this voluntary attention, and the art of the good speaker who knows his business can be nowhere more valuable than in this direction. Anyone who has watched a trained, experienced, clever teacher handle figures and difficult facts knows what an astonishing difference there is from the way of the clumsy amateur.

Anecdotes and illustrations.

But the great problem of the speaker is with the indifferent or hostile audience, with a class that is not keen on work, a jury that has half made up its mind, or an unsympathetic meeting. He cannot hope for voluntary

attention to his statement of the subject for its own sake, so he has to be aided by the laws of association. He has to make allusions, comparisons, or analogies, and has to use figures of speech that will be interesting, in order thus to get attention to his speech—that is, he has to aim at involuntary apperceptive attention. The clever speaker has sometimes to deal with a single disagreeable person in this way. He will hit upon an illustration or allusion that catches the interest of the disturber. That is often how "he who came to scoff remains to pray." It is for this purpose that anecdotal illustrations and stories are useful. But an illustration or story that does not directly contribute to the elucidation of a point, one that has no connection with the subject, and is dragged in for its own sake, should be avoided. The interest that is aroused by such means is only a fictitious interest with a tendency to distract and dissipate attention. Many a speaker, labouring under difficulties with an audience, has ventured upon an amusing tale, to his complete undoing, because the audience could not be got back to the subject after the disturbance of the irrelevant joke. The rule to be observed in the employ-

Useless devices.

ment of devices for arousing interest is that the interest must be a true apperceptive interest, which means that an idea has been so presented to the mind that it becomes assimilated to the existing mental content.

The involuntary apperceptive attention which the successful orator secures is a great tribute to his art. It means that he, in a sense, compels his audience to listen to him because he is, in a way that they cannot resist, linking his thoughts on to their thoughts.

Having enunciated the principle governing the relation of the laws of association to attention, it is possible to explain why anecdotes, long stories, and formal jokes, are out of place in certain assemblies; they are out of place wherever voluntary attention is vouchsafed by the audience. Where direct voluntary attention is possible, it is sheer folly to resort to the devices for securing the indirect involuntary attention. The man who wants to know the facts is impatient at jokes and anecdotes. The House of Commons is an assembly that will listen to relevant facts of immediate interest, and, because it wants to attend to such facts, an ordinary platform joke or story sounds

quite incongruous there. Voluntary attention is what the speaker has to aim at securing, but he must know when he has got it, and proceed accordingly.

The greatest and final achievement of the speaker in the intellectual sphere* is to so master an indifferent, a lethargic, or a hostile audience that, beginning with involuntary attention, secured through the laws of association, he gets the audience to settle down, to give him their attention, until bit by bit they fall into the habit of listening to him. This is the passive voluntary attention; the audience voluntarily attend, though without any sense of active effort, by yielding passively to the masterful power of the orator over them. A striking example of this is to be found in Ben Jonson's description of Bacon's power as a speaker: "There happened in my time one noble speaker who was full of gravity in his speaking; his language, where he could spare or pass by a jest, was nobly censorious. No man ever spake more neatly, more pressly,

Bacon's power over attention.

* It must be remembered that here, for purposes of discussion, the important function of appeals to emotion is left out of consideration.

more weightily, or suffered less emptiness, less idleness in what he uttered; no member of his speech but consisted of its own graces. His hearers could not cough or look aside from him without loss: he commanded when he spoke, and had his judges angry and pleased at his devotion. No man had their affections more in his power; the fear of every man that heard him was lest he should make an end."

Regular audience. Gathering of strangers.

The successful preacher or lecturer who is addressing the same people regularly for months or years can gradually create a taste or a mental content. He knows to-day what the auditors learned yesterday. Thus he can steadily educate his people up to the point of being interested in more and more academic and classic compositions. Once he has attained the position of being able to attract the people for the purpose of listening to his oratory, he can gradually lead them along the way of pure rhetoric, which it would be disastrous for him to attempt with a strange audience that has not the same mental content and association as his regular hearers. Many a great man has grievously disappointed a huge crowd of enthusiastic strangers, because of his neglect to bear in

mind this difference between his own regular audience and the gathering of strangers.

IV. Memory.

The regular speaker relies a great deal upon the memory of his hearers. He often finds it necessary, for the development of a theme, to recall some points in a previous discourse. In stimulating recall, he will find it very helpful to remember the laws of association, and to adopt one of the methods of suggestion by resemblance, similarity, contiguity, or contrast. Merely to suppose that an audience remembers a particular illustration or argument is not of much use. A reference to it, accompanied by some suggestion that will reach a link of association, is the effective way of proceeding.

But these remarks are bordering upon the question of imagination. So far the task of enlightening the understanding, or securing attention for information and instruction, has alone concerned us. It may suffice, therefore, to conclude this section on memory by a quotation from Stout's "Manual of Psychology," p. 423, which will put for the reader from another

Stout's example of reproduction.

point of view what is involved in the various processes of association and reproduction: "I see a man who reminds me of the Duke of Wellington by some resemblance in his personal appearance. I have never had occasion before to think of this man and the Duke in any kind of connection with each other. The ideal revival seems to give rise to a completely novel combination instead of reproducing a past combination. If this were really so, we could not properly speak of *association* as having anything to do with the matter. *Association* must at least imply that revival depends on objects having somehow come together in previous experience. In fact, a closer analysis shows that this actually is so in the example chosen, and in all instances of so-called *association by similarity*. What is really operative in calling up the idea of the Duke of Wellington is the personal appearance of the man in so far as it resembles that of the Duke. The experience I have now in looking at the man is partially the same in character as the experiences which I have previously had in looking at the Duke's portraits. The mental disposition left behind by these

experiences is partially re-excited, and in consequence it tends to be re-excited as a whole. But this re-excitement of the whole in consequence of the re-excitement of the part is due to continuity of interest, and not to any essentially distinct principle. The principle of continuity alone is operative, but it operates in a very different manner, and produces a very different result—reproduction by similarity and reproduction by contiguity, respectively. Reproduction by similarity is most aptly described by reference to its effect. It ought to be called reproduction of similars rather than reproduction by similarity. Reproduction by contiguity may be called, by way of distinction, *repetitive reproduction.* Both repetitive reproduction and the reproduction of similars are, in a sense, cases of reproduction by similarity. Neither involves complete identity. Smoke reminds me of fire because of preformed associations. This is repetitive reproduction. But the smoke I now see may have features of its own in which it differs from previous experiences: it may be more voluminous, lighter or darker in colour, and so on. In other words, there need only be similarity,

not complete identity. The points of difference do not contribute to bring about the reproduction. The partial identity is alone operative in this; but the specific differences none the less play a positive part in the process. Though they do not help to bring about the reproduction, they modify the nature of what is reproduced."

V. Imagination.

There are several different processes included under the term Imagination. There is the Reproductive form—that is, the recall and reproduction by memory of the image of the past impression. The speaker's success in securing such a recall depends upon his power of suggestion according to the Laws of Association.

Then there is a form of imagination which extends and builds up our knowledge—the Productive or Constructive form, which enables us to recombine and rearrange the image already in the mind, so as to form new images. The process is somewhat similar to that of discrimination and assimilation. The images we have in consciousness enable us to distin-

guish some new element in the picture, and we then build up a fuller and newer image; this enables a further discrimination to take place. The significance of this for the speaker is that, while he is graphically portraying a scene, his audience is engaged in building out of the details, as he brings them forth, pictures in the mind perhaps very different from the one that he wishes to have imaged there. It is important therefore to bring forth the details in the order that leads most directly to the combination desired, and to give the audience the minimum of temptation to anticipate the completion of the image by a strange and disconcerting one. In dreams, reverie, and phantasy, images are constructed which have no corresponding object in real experience. This unreality is often pleasurable, hence the fondness for fairy tales, etc.; but to convey an impression of such unreality when aiming at real substantial images is fatal.

Dangers of anticipatory images.

The speaker has also to bear in mind that the capacity of his hearers to build up certain images is limited by their experience; the material for building is rather limited in the mind of the country hind, who has seen

nothing and read of nothing outside the furrow he ploughs. The slum-bred audience cannot properly build up the image of snow-capped mountain and glacier gorge. So, while the aid of imagination for extending knowledge can be great, it must not be stirred to activity unless it can be kept within straight channels. The relation of imagination to thought and language is put as follows by Stout:

"An idea can no more exist without an image than perception can exist without sensation. But the image is no more identical with the idea than sensation is identical with perception. The image is only one constituent of the idea; the other and more important constituent is the meaning which the image conveys. There are some people, especially those who are much occupied with abstract thinking, who are inclined to deny that they have any mental imagery at all. They are almost or quite unable to visualize objects, and their general power of mentally reviving auditory and tactile experiences may also be rudimentary. The images which with them mark the successive steps in a train of ideas are mainly or wholly verbal. The words and

Verbal images.

their meaning are all that are present in such cases. Images resembling features or concomitants of the object thought about are absent. But it is inaccurate to say that such persons think without images, for the verbal image is just as much an image in the psychological sense as a visual picture of the object is."*

There is no doubt that to the average person imaginative pleasure is most readily afforded when the speaker skilfully conjures in his mind images of things, giving him time and every assistance, by a graphic style, to visualize the things. But there are other speakers who have not this graphic style, and are not really successful in stimulating the visualizing capacity of the audience. These have to fall back upon the "verbal images." They work their imaginative effect by clever turns of phrase, epithets, powerful adjectives, and the roll of mighty syllables. Gladstone is the great example of this. What a spell he cast upon his audience! How they enjoyed the tramp of his adjectives and the march of his spread-eagle sentences! Many a man caught

Gladstone's characteristics.

* "Manual of Psychology," p. 354.

thus in the "verbal eloquence," raised upon the rungs of words along the ladder of verbal imagination into heights of uncontrollable enthusiasm, has afterwards failed to account to others for the effect, and failed to point to any definite fact or statement, but has always dismissed such failure by repeating his assurance that it was grand to hear. Another master of powerful words and long, rolling sentences was Milton; but his style worked upon the "mental images." Gladstone's effect was not Miltonic in this respect, but Johnsonian.

The man who can work upon the "mental" may be described as the "poetic orator," and the one who works upon the "verbal" may by contrast be called the "prose orator." But these are only comparative, not absolute distinctions. The point to observe here is that both forms exist, and one man's style emphasizes one side more than the other. He who can handle either effectively achieves success.

Æsthetic aids.

Again, there is the æsthetic side of imagination. As to this, it has been suggested before that some preachers may not be concerned, so far as method as distinct from matter goes, about theological or Scriptural instruction as

such, but that they sometimes aim at appealing to the artistic instincts of the people. It is often good tactics for an advocate to tickle the fancy of a jury to make up for his bad case; and certainly a politician has constantly to win his way by conquest of imagination.

It is, of course, possible to set about the giving of instruction in such a way as to delight the imagination, without affecting the cogency and clearness of the presentation of the instruction. Indeed, the creation of a mental background of sympathy is almost indispensable for the easy working of the apperceptive processes that we have been considering.

The speaker must carefully balance the nature of the occasion, and the subject, in deciding how far he should depart from plain, direct, matter-of-fact prose. The instinct of the speaker must be the guide to determine the proportion and frequency of the purple patches. Every notable speech has such patches. The conventional demand of audiences for perorations to speeches illustrates the claims of imagination.

What those claims involve cannot be fully

described here; they are the claims of art in general. Skill in phrasing, in choosing words, in handling figures of speech, in arranging the matter, and skilful form generally, creates admiration, like all kinds of skill. The manipulation of images and tropes, with a similar effect to the poet's, acts upon the æsthetic tastes as poetry acts. Beauty of physical appearance, quality of voice, striking gesture, and the general arts of the orator, as with the actor, have their effect on the imagination.

The details of the qualities that make for success in the sphere of imagination will be dealt with in connection with figures of speech. For the present the matter may be summed up by saying that the provision for appealing to the imagination is in the art of speech similar to the drapery and ornament of painting, sculpture, and architecture. There are elaborate discussions on drapery and ornament, and the serious student who desires to get a full knowledge of the principles would do well to read up the subject. There he would learn the merits of simplicity or profusion of ornament, the principles by which drapery sets off the outlines of form or hides some essentials,

Drapery and ornament.

and the dangers of making the ornamentation confusing to the central theme. All these questions are general to art in every form. There is no doubt that the drapery of imagery and the ornaments of style do assist in the maintenance of attention and interest, and in creating that background of sympathy which, as has been explained above, is so essential to the task of plain instruction or mental enlightenment. The principle that was laid down in that connection operates here also. The speaker must not rely upon interest in the drapery or ornament. That will distract, and will defeat his purpose. The interest must be an apperceptive one, an interest which is linked by association with the subject and with some already existing interests in the mind of the hearer. The consequence of this consideration is that the kind of drapery or ornament which would be truly "apperceptive" for one audience would not be so for another. Images and graces of speech that find a quick response from a cultured audience fail in their effect with the uncultured, whereas the ornaments that would delight the latter may leave the former unmoved. It is this test of what is

"apperceptive" for the particular audience addressed which governs imagination as well as understanding.

It will probably be true to say that it is very rarely that speakers set themselves out to satisfy imagination alone. Imagination plays only a secondary part as a rule; it is only an aid, and not an end. As an aid, it must be sparingly used, and carefully dealt with when the object in view is that of clear exposition and an appeal to the understanding; but when the object is to excite passion or move the will, then its aid is almost unlimited in possibility. Figures of speech, as will be seen below, are the product of, and are worked upon imagination; and the part played by figures of speech in the higher purposes of oratory is unlimited in extent.

VI. Judgment and Belief.

On the intellectual side the speaker has to get his audience to form the judgment that he wishes to have formed, so it is necessary to refer to the process of the formation of judgments. You have a concept "iron" and a

concept "hard"; then you connect both together and become definitely conscious of a relation between the two concepts, and you form the judgment "Iron is hard." This judgment having been formed, gives rise to a new concept, "hard iron," which enables you to go on. The lawyer who is hoping to get a certain verdict from a jury has to bear in mind this process, viz.—that the jury form judgment after judgment in a cumulative series, one growing out of the other until the time for the further judgment arrives. If a juryman has commenced wrongly, and if early in the case he has formed a certain judgment on a vital portion of evidence, the danger is that from that point on he will use that judgment to discriminate and assimilate further and further against that lawyer's case. It is therefore of supreme importance that the jury should be favourably impressed at the very beginning, that the wheels of their thought should be started on the particular rails that it is hoped to have them run. The same thing applies to almost every audience. The first two sentences may so secure the approval of an audience that they start by trying to

Cumulative series of judgments.

discriminate further points to applaud; whereas, on the other hand, if the first few sentences lack interest, and the hearers form a poor judgment of the speaker, they proceed to discriminate further weaknesses. This evolutionary character of thought processes is too little kept in mind by the speaker. He is too prone to proceed as if the audience can be kept right by an occasional funny story or lucid passage here and there.

Then there is the difficulty of carrying the audience with you. This is due to failure on the part of the audience to form series of judgments rapidly and clearly enough. Two or more concepts or ideas may be presented to the mind, but no clear judgment of the relation is formed without difficulty. There is the difficulty with words that are imperfectly understood by the audience, the tendency to adopt opinions of others without exercising the mind about them at all, and the constant tendency to exaggeration due to the influence of feeling on the mind. All these things militate against clearness in judgments. The ordered movement from judgment to judgment brings us to the consideration of the need for

Relation of judgments.

attending to the relation between the judgments. This is the process of reasoning. It is of course the essential process in argumentative speeches. Textbooks on logic should be studied by the student who desires to enter deeply into the methods of reasoning. Inductive reasoning is of special interest. It is by induction generally that an audience is able to proceed safely from judgment to judgment, and conclusion to conclusion. The dangers that are always present are those of hasty inductions. They are more frequent and more awkward difficulties than those connected with deduction. The average man is able to keep fairly close to a good deductive process of reasoning; but an inductive process is full of traps and snares for him.

Judgment and reasoning are mixed up with belief. You cannot associate "iron" and "hardness," and then proceed to the judgment "Iron is hard," without believing first of all that iron possesses the property of hardness.

This question of the relation between knowledge and belief constitutes a whole body of psychological controversy. At present only a few plain practical points interest us.

Belief.

First of all there is the obvious fact that the speaker must be believed. Once the confidence of an audience is so lost, or the prejudice is so great, that they will not believe what is said, then things have reached a sorry pass. The propositions you affirm must be believed before you can get the audience to proceed to the judgment you wish to have formed. This difficulty of knowing whether the propositions are accepted is considerable under certain circumstances. Belief depends very much on a variety of circumstances largely emotional. People are in a mood for belief, doubt, or active disbelief, and the mood may vary from minute to minute. The art of the orator is to keep them in a mood that is partial to belief so far as the judgments will go. How this predisposition to a favourable mood is to be secured is discussed in Section VII. It is important that this purely psychological form of belief shall not be confused with other forms connoted by the term. All that this means is that once you know a thing to be so you believe it, and you cannot affirm the knowledge as an express judgment until you believe. Belief in this sense may therefore be defined as "Knowing

it to be so." The securing of this belief by the orator must be by making the thing perfectly clear to the mind, by dovetailing it to the mental content, to the knowledge already existing. Belief comes inevitably, and must come when that apperceptive process is complete.

The orator is sometimes, however, in the position that he has not enough evidence to proceed *a priori* from point to point, nor to bring about a proper mental process of pure apperception. He has to secure belief on trust, as it were. He has to create such an impression that the audience will believe statements because he makes them.

The only point for us here is that belief must be present at every step; and even if doubt hangs for some time during a speech, the speaker may get his audience round, but disbelief is fatal to any success.

What is believed?

How far can the orator draw upon the imagination of his audience and yet be believed? First of all, there must not be any explicit contradiction: a thing cannot be imagined as both black and white. Then, without going into the possibilities and limi-

tations of fictitious construction, some practical points for the orator can be found in the following passage: "Belief depends on subjective tendencies, just because these tendencies cannot work themselves out without it. Ends can only be realized by the use of means; but in order to use means we must have some belief in their efficacy—hence the impulse to pursue an end is also an impulse to form beliefs which will make action for the attainment of the end possible. But it is not within the range of our arbitrary selection to determine what means will lead up to a given end, and what will not. This depends on the nature of the real world in which we live. There must therefore in the framing of a belief be always some endeavour to conform to conditions other than, and independent of, our own subjective tendencies. . . . Our thinking, to be effective, cannot be free; we can no more attain our ends without submitting to control independently of our wish or will than we can walk independently of the resistance of the ground on which we tread. . . . Fear, or timidity, or gloomy suspicion, favours belief in disagreeable alternatives. . . . There is much

in the religious superstitions of savages which shows manifest traces of this influence of fear upon belief. . . . Ideal construction is . . . a social product; hence the beliefs of the individual are to an immense extent shaped and determined by the beliefs current in the community in which he lives."*

The orator's use of belief.

The direct points for the orator are: (1) That he must have regard to the superstitions, prevailing sentiments, degree of education, and conditions of life of his audience. Things readily believed by a country audience would be laughed aside as incredible by the city audience, or *vice versa*.

(2) Belief will be active in so far as the remarks are of direct practical interest to the audience. Airy generalities are not so fully accepted as concrete facts closely related to the prevailing interests of the audience.

(3) The end must be shown to be desirable first, and until the audience believes it to be desirable it will be futile to discuss the means; but once the desirability is accepted, then the means are of interest, and the orator has simply

* Stout, "Manual of Psychology," book iv., chap. viii.

to take them in the logical and psychological order, until he has secured the belief that they are the best means for attaining the end.

(4) The orator has a twofold problem in the above: he had to try to discover the subjective conditions of the audience rather than his own, and the objective conditions of the audience rather than his own. Action that may be easy for him may be impossible for the audience. Too often are the poor lectured from the standpoint of £10,000 a year.

(5) Let the orator meditate carefully upon the dependence of action on belief, and he will see how essential the above points are when a speech is intended to influence conduct.

Gesture and other emotional features play a great part in generating belief, and it is to emotion we now turn.

VII. To Move the Passions.

It is in connection with the passions that the orator's special gift is of greatest value. The fairly clear, pleasant-voiced essayist can do very well, so far as pure understanding goes. What is mainly required in order to instruct people is that the matter should be understood.

and attended to, and believed, and remembered. But if it is necessary to go one stage further, and to persuade an audience to some line of conduct or course of action, or to give a certain decision, then the matter must be made of interest, and it must be felt. It is for the task of persuading or dissuading that the art has to be exercised upon feeling.

Effect of feeling on attention.

The interesting side of our experience is made up of our pleasures and pains. This fact has a bearing on intellectual activity. The question of voluntary attention, and of its conversion into a passive attitude of attention, has been dealt with above as a purely intellectual process; but in practice it is rarely so. Almost everything depends on feeling. A wave of pleasurable emotion will make the attention more active, images will be recalled more easily, and thought processes will move with greater liveliness. On the other hand, a wave of painful aversion has the opposite effect. Hence, added to the method of procedure for securing attention must be the arts that create the proper undercurrents of feeling. An idea has to be floated in the mind of the hearer like a paper boat on a pool;

and there is always the danger of an upset. The speaker must bear in mind the psychological fact that strong feeling of any kind interferes with mental processes. He may do well to remember, when he himself is labouring under violent emotion, that it must be restrained if he wishes to have the mental capacity for doing justice to a great occasion in a speech or sermon. An audience that has been frightened by some accident or fearful noise is in no state for listening to an address. The orator must always restrain the strong passions of his audience until he is drawing to a close; he may let them loose then; but once a crowd has lost control of its feelings, speaking is of no value at all. Many a misguided speaker at, for instance, a meeting of men on strike has started off to excite the men, only to find that in a few minutes they get beyond his and everyone's control. It is also foolish to give the audience shocks. Once they have had a strong shock, the whole balance of the mind has been upset. Similarly it is a mistake to use an anecdote which is likely to affect the feelings very violently. Such things throw the mind out of gear for attention to anything

requiring intellectual cogency. Of course it must be clearly understood that pain, grief, sorrow, anger, are in a moderate degree pleasurable. The common expression of "feeling better" after giving vent to one's feelings is an illustration of this. The tale that moves an audience to gentle tears or the facts that bring out a cry of shame are in moderation pleasurable. They are powerful in establishing the bonds of sympathy between the speaker and his audience. It is by means of feeling that a crowd can be moulded into an entity. By laughter, enjoyment, tears, groans, the individuals become a cohesive mass. The first task of the orator with a large crowd is to dissolve it into a single whole. So long as different individuals are assuming different attitudes and different forms of attention, an oratorical triumph is not possible. Once the individuals are got to laugh together or cry together they are in the speaker's hand; he has them bound to him with the cord of sympathy, he can sway them as one man and deal with them as one mind.

Some psychologists describe this solvent effect of sympathy as a contagion of feeling. Contagion of feeling.

The spreading of that contagion must be the orator's first business. His triumph is found when people have left the meeting and begin to reflect, and discover that they have been applauding and lending their hearts to a speaker with whose sayings they profoundly disagree. "Those who came to scoff remained to pray"—there is the consummation of the art. Essays, pamphlets, paper rhetoric of any kind, can never achieve this. It is by the magnetism of feeling over the feelings of others that converts are made. The prejudiced mind cannot be opened to reason by cold written prose; but its doors can be burnt away by the heat of passion, and entrance can then be secured for the reasonable statement of the other point of view.

Physical manifestations.

It will be recognized that physical accompaniments play a great part in the sphere of emotion. There are two ways of stimulating feeling: (1) By direct sense impressions, or association, or memory, or imagination; (2) by showing the feeling yourself. The latter comprises the whole art of the actor. He studies the physical accompaniments that will set forth the passion that the playwright has dramatized.

The question of realism in his art is one of long and keen dispute, and will never be settled. But the speaker has no need to be concerned with that dispute. He must not feign passion, he must not merely act; as we saw earlier, the speaker must be sincere. If he is genuinely moved by passion, he must let the usual natural physical accompaniments reveal that passion. The gestures must be stimulated by, and only by, the sheer constraining influence of a moving emotion; they must be inevitable, so inevitable that the audience does not notice them; they must be so of a piece with the emotional incident in the address that there is nothing incongruous or obtrusive about them. When genuine emotion thus reveals itself with perfect spontaneity and naturalness, the feelings of the audience are stirred. Often a wave of the hand, when words have choked with a sob in the throat, breaks down a whole hall of strong men. The silent sorrow of a sincere face moves a crowd, when words cannot be framed. The face, eye, arms, and body, of the righteously indignant man can win a lost cause. And above all these is the voice which

Sincerity.

will win its victories if left alone to express the emotion in its own way. But once more let us emphasize the point that the faintest tinge of artificiality, or design, or acting, is fatal. The speaker has by his manner—and thus alone can it be done—to convey one vital fundamental impression: that of sincerity. Sincerity means that the man is speaking because he must, wants you to believe because he believes, wants you to act because he strongly desires it. This revelation of sincerity is a condition precedent to the creation of the sympathy that has been seen to be so important.

Effect of over-stimulation.

There are, however, two very important considerations in this connection. The speaker must not allow his feelings to run riot, and must not allow the physical accompaniments to run to excess. As has been stated already, the effect of the first will be twofold: it will unfit him for thinking cogently and for presenting his thoughts in effective order, and it will likewise unsettle the minds of his hearers. There is also another effect, based upon the psychological fact that over-stimulation may convey a pleasure to the ear for a time, but if

it is prolonged it may become unbearably painful. So one might cite examples for all the senses. Pleasure palls if long continued, and surfeit of high literary or artistic delight becomes objectionable.

This partly physiological, partly psychological consideration is of importance to the speaker. When under a powerful emotion he raises his voice, it may stir the audience to its depths; but if he keeps his voice at a shouting pitch, or in a strained tone very long, it gradually becomes objectionable, pain takes the place of pleasure, and attention is dissipated. How many speakers with good voices there are who shout too much, and keep too long on a harsh note! There must be variety of tone that will relieve the ear and keep fresh and undimmed its capacity for listening with pleasure.

Similar remarks apply to gesture. If the same motion of the arms or body is continued it becomes monotonous and non-pleasurable. They also apply to images, long illustrations, analogies, and close syllogistic reasoning. The mind must not be kept on the stretch too long. Laughter that is too continuous or frequent loses its freshness: and pathos that

moved with effect becomes morbid and most objectionable if prolonged.

Effect of understimulation.

The second consideration follows upon the other. Gesture, voice, and the physical accompaniments or expression of passion, should not be too perfunctory. There are speakers who are immobile, who while uttering words that are strong in passionate phrases do so in such a cold, mechanical fashion that the audience is stirred by no feeling, and but little sympathy with the speaker or his subject is generated.

Between this extreme of restraint and the other extreme of uncontrolled expression comes the happy mean which the instinct of genius is able to strike. When an attempt is made to write an explanation, or to frame rules or definitions concerning this artistic mean, we come upon the eternally controversial question of realism in art. But since we have ruled out the conscious art of the actor, and have founded ourselves on the basis of sincerity, we can avoid that question. It will suffice to make one practical observation to sum up on this point. The orator while moved by passion must allow free play to the gestures, and voice,

and manner, naturally prompted by his emotion; but they should be restrained, not so much and in such a way as to stiffen or to stultify them, but sufficiently to intensify them.

The restraint to put on is that which concentrates the pent-up force into tenfold power. The audience should always be made to feel that there is more pain, suffering, indignation, or joy behind than they can see manifested. This capacity for impressing an audience with the sense of restraint, and at the same time the sense that there is a tremendous force of emotion behind, is the great capacity of the great orator.

Having made these general observations, we may now pass on to a more detailed notice of certain important forms of feeling. The prevailing of certain feelings gives rise to moods. These moods are very important for the purpose of the orator. He may find an audience in a good free, easy mood; then some dreary preliminaries or unsuccessful speeches slowly change the mood into one of indifference or hostility. This change makes it necessary for the orator to row against the stream, and he

Moods.

may find the current too strong for him. It is exceedingly necessary for the speaker who is anxious to succeed to endeavour to diagnose the mood of his audience, and to adopt a course suitable to such a mood. The three ruling moods are those of hope, doubt, and fear, and there are innumerable gradations between them. If an audience has come in a mood of hope as to the realization of some much-desired object, and the speaker wants to confirm and extend the spirit of hopefulness, he must proceed to deal with the possibilities of attaining the end, and the greater those possibilities are made to appear to the audience, the nearer will the vague hope approach to certain expectation.

Resignation. On the other hand, if the hearers are in a dangerous mood, due to the irritation of a certain fear that has affected them concerning something in which they are keenly interested, and if the speaker wishes to get them into a mood of *resignation*, he must proceed gradually to make the possibility of attaining their desire appear smaller and smaller.

Doubt. Sometimes the mood may be one of *doubt*—*i.e.*, the chances of realizing or failing to realize

the end may be almost equally balanced. To convert that doubt into positive hope or positive fear, the direct procedure is to deal with the possibility of realization of the end.

But in dealing with moods it must be remembered that they are more difficult to reach and to move than thoughts or fancies are. Intellectual concurrence is much more quickly got than a change of mood. In disease people lose their intellectual powers much sooner than their habits of feeling. Nevertheless, it is through the relation of new thoughts to existing thoughts that new feelings can be made to take the place of old feelings.

Where memory is concerned, it is well to bear in mind that, though the ideas or images are recalled, it takes longer to recall the feelings or moods that accompany those ideas or images.

Feelings slow to recall.

Feelings take some time to unfold, so the speaker who is bent upon rousing the feelings must keep harping upon the same point for some time. Able men of great intellectual power leave their audiences cold and unmoved, very often because of their habit of relevant concise utterance; they pass on directly from point to

point, idea to idea, and the audience follows with considerable intellectual pleasure, picking up the allusions, and readily calling up the images suggested by the words of the speaker, but not once are the lower depths where the feelings lie touched and moved.

The elaboration of a point, dwelling upon it sufficiently to allow the feelings to be reached, is not to be lightly dismissed with depreciatory remarks about repetition or prolixity. These negative canons of composition are not absolute, but are relative to the object of the speaker and the mood of the audience.

Some phases of emotion.

Almost all the higher emotions have been evolved from feelings which originated in the instinct of self-preservation in the child, and the maternal instinct in the family. There was in the beginning a selfish reason why the child loved this or that; but gradually the object became loved for its own sake, and the reason why it was first liked was lost sight of and forgotten. Psychologists pursue the analysis of the evolution from self-indulgence to self-sacrifice, up to the larger question of evolution in a society as part of a social mass of feeling, a mass that it is difficult to move out of the way.

There is no need to follow the analysis here, but only to pick out some points of practical interest. First there is the fact that the love of parents for their children is stronger than the love of the children for the parents, and the general principle associated with it, that the love of giving is stronger than the love of receiving. This is a psychological fact that the speaker should note. To endeavour to persuade an audience that you are giving them something good, either in the quotations, or the method or manner of your speech, or in the facts or promises or argument that you are supplying, may have some effect, but there is always a much greater effect if you solicit the sympathy and indulgence of the audience. Let the audience feel that they are encouraging you, helping you along in a difficult task. Your humility and diffidence (not hesitation), the sense of inadequacy from your point of view, eliciting the appoval and applause of the audience, generates deeper emotions.

Sympathy.

This comes out in a special form in the relation between pleasure and pain. The feeling of compassion for the weaknesses or sufferings of others is much more easily aroused

than the feeling of satisfaction for the joys of others. And any sense of pain or suffering makes a much deeper impression than pleasure. In any case each individual realizes the feelings of others by recognizing their similarity to his own feelings. Consequently persons like simple village folk, whose experience has been a narrow one, or young men, or students who have had little knowledge of the ups and downs of life, or persons whose intellectual or imaginative interests are few, have very narrow sympathies, so that any attempt to arouse ambition, envy, or the higher sympathies, must be carefully measured according to the capacity of the audience. The distinguished visitor who comes to address a crowd of undergraduates realizes how fruitless are appeals to such standards and sympathies as appeal to other audiences. The more remote the feeling is from the object, the more it depends on the power of thought and imagination and memory, and consequently the wider range of sympathy is determined by the knowledge and capacity and past experience of the individual. Rough men who endure pain without flinching, as savages do, have little fellow-feeling with more sensitive and

civilized beings, and appeals to philanthropy are vain amongst them. If feelings are to be remembered, there must be sufficient imaginative power to put ourselves in the place of others. It is for this reason that differences of language, race, colour, social conditions, make real, genuine sympathy difficult: they interfere with the attempt to feel as others feel.

There are three of the higher ethical forms constantly appealed to by speakers—duty, repentance, conscience. *Duty* arises in a conflict between a universal feeling of being one of a society of many persons, and purely egoistic feelings. *Repentance* arises when the individual stands as a judge upon his own actions.

Conscience acts when the past experiences are fused together into one impulse. To magnify the universal feeling as against the egoistic, to exalt the judge-self against the culprit-self, to set the power of the past against the lapse of the present—roughly, that is how the achievements of the orator are to be successful.

The *sublime*, *reverence*, *religious feelings*—these are for separate treatises, so we pass on.

Conflicts between passion and reason.

This is the sum of it all—that mere reason has no real power in actual mental life; there the struggle is always between feelings, not between abstract thoughts or ideas. The talk about conflicts between passion and reason is erroneous; there is no such conflict. If a thought suppresses a feeling, it does so only by giving rise to another feeling to take its place. Feeling is always present in every act of consciousness, and one feeling taking the place of another is the ordinary procedure.

Of course, clear-cut reasoning, description, narration, or exposition, may be the best way for, say, resignation to supplant fear, or doubt to unseat hope; but, whatever the means, let it be understood that the orator has to do with feelings.

The recognition of this truth clears the way for will and conduct to be discussed.

VIII. To Influence the Will.

Persuasion.

The orator has not only to persuade a person to accept and to believe certain truths, or to merely give him the pleasure of a delighted imagination or the pleasure of emotion or

passion: the aim of most speeches is to move the will to give a certain verdict, record a certain vote, join a church or organization, subscribe to some object or undertake some enterprise that calls for sacrifice and effort.

Some notes as to the relation between ideas and feelings, and the will and action are therefore necessary, if we are to understand the final and ultimate task of the orator.

Bain gives a definition that makes a convenient starting-point:

"Oratorical persuasion endeavours to obtain the co-operation of the natural activity of free beings, their sense of good and evil, and their passionate excitement for some proposed line of conduct, by so presenting it in language as to make it coincide with those impulses."

The new term that we now come across is *Impulse*. What is impulse? What are the prevailing impulses of audiences? What are the means for assimilating the object desired by the speaker with those prevailing impulses?

Explanation of terms.

The explanation of all these things is only found by an examination of the feelings. All pleasure and pain sets organism in movement. There is an involuntary desire to retain what

gives pleasure. When there is a passive contemplation of, or dwelling on, the object that gives the pleasure, we get what is called *Delight*. *In Love* we have an active impulse to make the object of our pleasure secure to us. Similarly, there is an involuntary desire to remove from us the object that causes pain, or to remove ourselves from it. When the pain is associated with a definite idea of the cause, there is *Aversion* or *Anger*. When it is felt that no reaction is possible upon the object, and there is a passive contemplation of it, then there is *Sorrow*.

The movements consequent upon pleasure or pain are—

Motor Ideas.

1. Simple bodily reflex movements, such as the withdrawal of a finger when hurt.

2. Impulse: which is more or less reflex like the above, but there is an idea of the end to which the movement leads, and there is some disquiet for attaining the end.

3. Desire: this is that included under impulse, with the addition of control by distinct ideas.

To get a proper act of will you must first of all have ideas of the end of the action, a

vivid feeling of the worth of the end, and see the means for the realization of the end.

Ideas that are determined by the thought of the end become *Motor Ideas* that bring about movement. It is this idea of the end that distinguishes impulse and desire from *Instinct.* The movements of instinct come by immediate sensations, and means are applied to an end that is unconscious; but impulse and desire have an idea of the end, though the means may not be clear.

Motor Impulse.

Impulse in striving after what is covered by the idea is striving after that which is pleasurable, but that does not mean the idea of pleasure itself as such. The motive of an impulsive action is the feeling excited by the idea of the end, not the feeling excited by the idea that we shall feel pleasure on attaining the end.

Now, a motor impulse presupposes the memory of executed movement, and thus repetition of a movement that causes pain may be presented, or there may be a tendency to repeat a movement that gave pleasure. It is possible to predispose oneself to a certain action; and when one is prepared to execute

a certain movement, he does so almost involuntarily when the signal is given. This attitude of expectation has an important bearing on attention. Ideas that are based on strong interest or violent emotion form the strongest centres of association; and attention is generally paid only to those ideas that are supported and strengthened by interest—*e.g.*, "Love is blind only because it is wonderfully sighted in one respect." Feeling creates an active expectant attention. Any mental tension gives rise to anticipation—*e.g.*, one expecting a carriage thinks he hears the rumbling. This anticipatory effect enables the mind to skip the steps in a reasoned argument.

Feeling and attention.

A speaker can play upon all these psychological features. He can by his manner put the audience into a mood for expecting big things, and by the expectant attitude created by feeling obtain a lively attention not otherwise possible. The thought, or epigram, or style, that carries the audience away from the distractions of their surroundings, of their personal prejudices or their preconceived doubts or ideas, is the Open Sesame for conviction, conversion, co-operation, and action.

The reader who has not read, or who cannot find the time to master the full treatment in some standard psychological textbook may feel that the above technical summary of the terms used in the textbooks is difficult to comprehend, and does not give him a clear answer to the question as to how a judgment passes into an act, and how the speaker is to deal with the various steps involved; so it may be well to endeavour to follow in concrete form another detailed analysis of the process. For this purpose nothing better can be done than to follow the cogent, clear, and simple analysis in the opening chapters of Mackenzie's "Manual of Ethics"—chapters that every student of rhetoric should read over and over, and chapters that can be read with much pleasure owing to the delightful expository and literary style. A special article by Professor Stout is also drawn upon for some illustrations and additional points.

To begin with, let us set before our minds in full prominence once more the task that the orator has to tackle: the material he has to work upon is man; he has to get that being to do something.

The problem restated.

Let us therefore trace the various ways in which a man is moved to action.

A man may have a vague animal *want* for food. Then he may become conscious in a vague, undefined way that a dinner would satisfy the *want*, and that vague conscious element becomes an *appetite* for dinner. Then the mind gets to regard the dinner as something worth securing, and that representation of dinner as an end worth aiming at is the creation of a *desire*. That a desire involves a definite idea of some end worth attaining has been explained before. As will be seen presently, every act of will presupposes *desire ;* and when the orator wants to get his audience to do something, he must first of all arouse a *desire* to do it. To accomplish that, he must set forth the end to be attained so attractively that its worth for them is accepted. The part played by feeling in this process has been dealt with. Now we come upon a new and very important point. Readers will recollect how we had, while dealing with the more purely intellectual side, to have regard, not to isolated single ideas, but to such ideas as part of a mental sphere or "mental content"; we have now to

consider something analogous. Though we speak of a desire for this and a desire for that, we cannot regard as possible at all the existence of an individual separate *desire* as something detached and cut apart from other desires. As there was a "field of vision," so there is a "field of desire." But for this purpose Professor Mackenzie has made use of a very apt, helpful phrase. He calls it a "Universe of Desire." He explains the term by showing that we can talk with consistency and truth of fairies within the Universe of Romance, of Purgatory within the Universe of Dante's Poems. A novelist or dramatist creates a "character" with a certain "Universe," and the critic sometimes has to complain that some actions or sayings are not consistent with the general point of view, or "Universe," of the character. Now, having got a term, it can be worked out. The same person changes from one "Universe" to another. There is a "Universe" with a certain set of desires on Sundays, another on holidays, another on week-days; there may be one at home, another in the office, etc. He may be in one "Universe" when in a certain mood or state of health,

Universe of desire.

and in another when the mood or health changes.

As every single desire has to be considered in relation to the "Universe" of which it is a part, the reader will see how important a part is played by moods and feelings, and how necessary it is for the orator to stimulate and maintain a certain mood, as was pointed out above.

It may help if we borrow an example of a statesman making up his mind for peace or for war. It is not the strongest single desire that predominates, but the strongest "Universe."

His mind may revolve for some time within the "Universe" of the "good of his country," and a set of powerful desires influence him; then he moves into the "Universe" of "personal ambition," and here, as in the previous case, all sorts of desires, his past disappointments, his present embarrassments, his future hopes, crowd upon him; then, similarly, there is the "Universe" of the "welfare of his family or friends" or the "Universe" of the "views and wishes of his constituents."

Such, then, is the task of the orator. He must not say, "Let me play up to this one

definite, clean-cut desire"; no such thing is possible; that desire is like the central eddy of a whirlpool—touch it, and you affect all the eddies; or touch the whirlpool anywhere, and the central eddy is influenced. When the orator proposes to influence desire, he has to deal with a whirling mass of many eddies changing and ever moving, a whirling mass that often moves across the ever-flowing river of consciousness as well as along with it, and as it moves is changed according to the varying depths of emotions or moods. Perchance when he, fond man, is working upon some pathetic strain, or some desire he knows to be strong in his audience, he calls forth laughter rather than tears. The "Universe" into which it sinks with the audience at the time may be very different from the "Universe" present to his mind: hence the incongruous result. The orator must set out from the beginning to create the proper "Universe" for his audience. When he thinks he has done so, he can directly proceed to stimulate the desire. Every experienced speaker has felt a certain joke or certain pathetic appeal impossible for a long time during his speech, and then later on

has felt that he could make it with complete success. A point that he made at one meeting a few minutes ago he feels cannot be made at this meeting. It is not merely a matter of mood, that accounts for much, but he must first, as some speakers say, "grip them," "get hold of them," which means that he must have time and opportunity to bring them into the "Universe" he requires. This is more than having regard to the "mental content"; that has to be considered for the purpose of putting the mind in possession of the cold facts, or instructing the audience as to the data. Here we are engaged on a further, a subtler, a grander task—that of moving the instructed, enlightened person to action. It is not instruction plus a favourable mood got by stirring the emotions. The task is further than that. The intellectual and emotional successes are indispensable; those are taken for granted. Towards the final stimulation to action all the intellectual and all the emotional aid should have been directed. Then, when he thinks that by his appeals to intellectual and emotional processess he has got the audience into the "Universe," that is the time, and not till then,

when the definite play upon an active desire can safely be made. This is what is meant by talking of the "psychological moment" for an appeal: the "psychological moment" is the moment when the psychological conditions have been fullfilled, when the "Universe" is secured. Take the case of the statesman quoted above. The audience may have met to vote for peace or war. The orator knows that the "national ambition," "the honour and welfare of friends or Britons abroad," "the party policy" are "Universes" within which they would desire war; so he proceeds throughout to enlighten them as to the "permanent good of the country." He calls history, economic conditions, etc., to his aid. Then he begins his appeals to emotion, to loss of life, sorrow, etc., and then to the higher emotions of universal brotherhood, etc., and gradually works them into this "Universe" of the country's permanent welfare. If he succeeds, he keeps them there awhile, full of enthusiasm, national pride, etc., and then launches his direct appeal for peace. If he had commenced by appealing to the desire for peace, when the audience were within a "Universe" of "foreign prejudice"

The psychological moment.

or some other gathered from the daily press, he would meet disaster.

How verdicts are lost.

The advocate with a jury has to bear this in mind. It is fatal for him to be indifferent in the early stages of the case, and to allow the opposing side to score one false impression after another on the minds of the jury, while he smiles and murmurs that he has a "trump card" to play at the end. He may find, as often happens, that his "trump card" does not perform its work. For his point to appeal effectively, so as to affect the verdict, it must find the jury ready to receive it. If they have for hours been moving within a certain "Universe," then his point falls flat, is not credited, and not appreciated. The lawyer who has such a final point of value must bend all his efforts from the commencement, so as to insure that when the time comes he will find the appropriate "Universe" for its successful appeal. Every move on the other side that may switch off the jury to another "Universe" must be counteracted.

Some politicians, too, make the mistake of thinking that the atmosphere that is being created by newspapers or societies, or speakers

from day to day within their constituencies may be ignored, and all will be well when they go down to explain. There is a point when explanations come too late. It may take some time to move a constituency from the old "Universe" of desires to a new one; but once it is done, then the politician cannot get them back by a flying visit or a chance speech. Of course, if they had not become transported into the new "Universe," but were only disturbed by various single desires, he would be in time, and could sweep away these new desires by using the old desires of the dominant universe. Once, however, the actual shifting out of that old "Universe" into a new one has taken place, then he has a tough job before him to get them back again. This accounts for so many of the surprises of the ballot-box. Is not this largely the meaning of the "swing of the pendulum" at General Elections? The "swing of the pendulum" is not so chance or erratic a thing as some regard it. Quietly and steadily for many months, or perhaps years, a cumulative series of influences have made a new world of political desires for certain people; they slowly move round to

The swing of the pendulum.

another point of view, a new "Universe." When the General Election comes, passionate speeches, one device after another, single appeals to this passion or this desire, are too late. The electors give ear to those who touch the desires that cohere within the "Universe" they have for some time privately and quietly been moving in.

Sudden change to be avoided.

When a speaker has succeeded in bringing an audience within the "Universe" he needs for his purpose, he must not change suddenly backwards and forwards. People cannot move very quickly from one "Universe" to another. They can move from one desire to another. But the speaker must endeavour to deal only with desires that are part of the particular "Universe." Otherwise the audience will be broken up into fragments, some under one set of desires, and others under others, and the act of will may be intercepted in a way such as we shall discuss presently.

The speaker may now realize the complexity of the task of influencing conduct; and it is important that he should realize that it is not by concentration upon some one single desire that action is to be stimulated. Preachers

often overdo the pathetic appeal; they harp so often and so long upon one aspect that it becomes morbid, or repulsive, or at least ineffective. Bring the congregation into the proper wide "Universe," and very little need be said of the one delicate direct desire. The elevation of one such "Universe" on broad lines into a predominating position is the achievement of the orator: the great orator lifts his audience to such a height that he has no need to touch the direct issue. Shakespeare nowhere reveals his genius for handling the psychology of human nature better than in Antony's oration. Readers will remember that Antony had permission from the conspirators to carry Cæsar's coffin to the market-place and to deliver the usual funeral oration. Antony knew that the conspirators would be on the watch for the faintest excuse from his words to put him to death as well, and he knew that there was much sympathy amongst the populace for the conspirators and against Cæsar. The "Universe" of suspicion, envy, aversion, etc., against Cæsar, was the one in which were the desires of the crowd. So Shakespeare with wonderful insight puts

Antony's speech.

Antony to begin by repudiating any intention of "praising" Cæsar, which was usual on such occasions in Rome: he had only come to bury Cæsar. Praise would not have found a compatible "Universe," and might have roused the existing and dominating desires antipathetic to Cæsar, to wreak further mischief upon the one who ventured to extol him. Besides, had not Brutus just preceded him in the pulpit, and obtained the concurrence of the crowd in his charge against Cæsar's ambition? So Antony kept repeating that Brutus was an honourable man, and that he did not contradict Brutus's statement, but he proceeded to recite what profits Cæsar from time to time brought home for the citizens. Then Shakespeare's First Citizen declares: "Methinks there is much reason in his sayings." So the mental outworks are entered. Then he proceeds to the emotions. He produces Cæsar's will. He does not propose to read it, as then they might be moved to wrong Brutus and Cassius, which he has no intention of encouraging. Then he tells what he thinks they would do if they knew what it contained. Gradually they are drawn from the "Universe" of the conspirators to curiosity about Cæsar's dispositions.

Antony works skilfully. "'Tis good you know not that you are his heirs. For, if you should, O, what would come of it!" So while Antony is repudiating responsibility, they become clamorous and insistent that the will shall be read. Having got them away from the "Universe" of suspicion, and into the "Universe" of interest in Cæsar, Antony proceeds to stir the desire for revenge. He holds back the "will," the central desire touching their own selfish interests, and Cæsar's direct "love" for them. He asks them to "make a ring about the corpse of Cæsar, and let me show you him that made the will." He begs leave to be allowed to descend: they give him leave. He is weaving around the crowd, with himself as centre, the horizon of a "Universe" of sympathy for himself and the cause he stands for. They now stand within this "Universe." Then he expatiates upon the mantle, ending with the "rent through which the well-beloved Brutus stabbed," until at last he can say:

"O, now you weep; and, I perceive, you feel
The dint of pity: these are gracious drops.
Kind souls, what, weep you when you but behold
Our Cæsar's vesture wounded? Look you here,
Here is himself, marred, as you see, with traitors."

After they recover their first shock at the sight of the dead leader, they fasten on his chance word "traitors," and cry "Revenge!"

The "Universe" is now complete, and it is the "psychological moment" for the central desire to be played upon. He restrains them, prevaricates, and then finally reveals the terms of the will, and action follows immediately. He simply declares quietly: "Now let it work, Mischief, thou art afoot."

So the orator, preacher, lawyer, what you will, can, once he has, as Antony had, skilfully and psychologically made the proper "Universe," dominate everything, get the action he desires without asking for it in cold formal words. The reader will have observed the considerable part played by "suggestion," as distinct from bald open formal statement, in this process. The value of "suggestion" was dealt with earlier. It is the audience that must be brought to think, to feel, to desire; the more the speaker can obliterate his share in the thinking, feeling, or desiring, the better.

In everyday practice, "There's many a slip 'twixt the cup and the lip." A certain

"Universe" of desire may acquire predominance, but many things may happen before action ensues.

There may be many things "wished" for. Any single desire that happens to predominate at a particular moment becomes a "wish." We may wish for one thing after another, now wishing for this, and then for its opposite. Many things may be "wished" for that cannot be "willed." We can "wish" for a change of weather, but we cannot "will" it. That which is "willed" is not a single desire, but the dominant "Universe" of desire. In order to trace the steps that finally lead to an act, there are some terms to be explained. More terms explained.

The first of the further elements in the act of will is the *resolution* to do it. This may be further analyzed into *purpose*, *intention*, and *motive*. When we speak of our *purpose* to do something, we refer more especially to a mental activity—*i.e.*, so far as our mental decision goes, we have decided to do it. But we also have some *intention* in doing it. The intention does not refer to our mental position so much as to the end towards which the activity is directed. Professor Mackenzie works out a list of various

forms of intention. It may perhaps suffice if we summarize them as follows:

- Immediate intention—to save a man from drowning.
- Remote intention—to save a man from drowning so as to hang him.

- Outer intention—to save a man from drowning.
- Inner intention—to save a man from drowning because we cannot ourselves bear the sight.

- Direct intention—to save a man from drowning.
- Indirect intention—to save a man from drowning, and assist the police by so doing.

- Conscious (avowed) intention—to benefit mankind.
- Unconscious (real) intention—self-interest.

- Formal Intention—the principle involved in the act.
- Material Intention—the result of the act.

It is obvious that the speaker must always bear these various forms in mind. Then there is, finally, the *motive*. It is identical with the intention sometimes, but not of necessity always. Shooting your pet dog afflicted with rabies to prevent him biting others may be your *intention*, but the shooting is no part of your motive as such—your *motive* is saving the lives of others. There is one other point. There is some controversy amongst psychologists as to the relation of pleasure and pain to

our motives. It may suffice here to quote one sentence summing up: "the idea of accomplishing our ends is pleasant; but the motive is not pleasure—we get pleasure by aiming at something else." This point has been dealt with before. The speaker must not set himself out to give pleasure to the audience, merely as pleasure or amusement; he must bring them to desire objects the realization of which would be pleasant to them; and the thought of being able to realize these gives rise to agreeable feelings. Likewise the speaker must not by anecdote or description proceed to stir the feeling of pity for one suffering injustice or distress, simply for the sake of stimulating pity as an end, or as a motive to action for alleviating the sufferer. Pity cannot be a motive or an inducement to action. Professor Mackenzie points out that we may feel pity, and even shed tears, at the sight of distress on the stage during a theatrical performance; but we are not moved to action in relief of the distressed. A *motive* is a thought of an end that it is desirable for us to attain, and is "in harmony or conformity with the Universe within which it is presented"; and when we believe that the

The forming of motives.

end can be brought about by our activity, then we have a possible motive to action.

The fact that we feel pity, or pain, or joy, at the contemplation of the end may help very considerably to bring the action to an issue. But what the speaker has to realize is that these feelings are only aids—means to the end. His task is to make powerful motives, and the part played by pure feeling in that process has been shown above. The mistake some speakers make is to aim at arousing the feelings, as though the feelings were motives to action. Hence the failure of pathetic appeals that become maudlin and flat. It is indispensable to stir the feelings. It is by manipulating the emotions that the great orator reveals his genius; but he manipulates them to prepare, to aid, to strengthen, the resolution; his primary task is to fix the purposes and get the motives formed. Mark Antony disavowed any intention of playing upon the feelings of the citizens; he made a show of restraining them. He was quietly aiming at forming the motive of revenge. In forming the motive, and to give it velocity, he appealed subtly to every emotion in their hearts. If he had gone

clumsily about an appeal to pity and tears, it would have ended there; but right through was the clear design, and some phases of sympathy were drawn upon while others were not, as best suited the end he wished to attain. Often has one anecdote too many, or an irrelevant bit of pathos at the last moment, dissolved the crystallizing intentions of an audience; and a speaker has lost his verdict or vote thereby. Place the motive in front, keep your eye fast upon it, and let nothing be done that does not lift, and lift, and lift that motive more and more into prominence.

The place of reason.

But where does *reason* come in? Such one imagines to be the question already disturbing the reader's mind. Are not people carried away by their feelings to commit precipitate acts, bring in foolish verdicts, or vote blinded by passion or prejudice? Unfortunately they are, and we shall have to consider this further. But such actions are not *purposive* actions, they belong to a class of *involuntary* actions that are not due to definite *acts of will*, so they do not affect the academic discussion of the question as to how desire becomes an accomplished act of will. But it is possible to have a "Universe"

of desire based upon persistent or deep-seated passion. The "Universe" of revenge, of hatred, of love, of religious ecstasy, may last for a prolonged period, and lead to a force of will and consistent fulfilment of resolutions not possible apart from the driving force of such passion.

This is in contrast to one who acts according to reason, though there is not much in this distinction that can be profitably gone into here. If the "Universe" of desire is a rational one, then we act according to reason rather than passion. If a man is always, like Socrates, for example, supposed to be living within a rational "Universe," then his line of action is always a reasonable line. As to what constitutes a rational "Universe," the reader must be referred to ethical philosophy; that is outside our question. The point for the speaker is that he has a certain action to stimulate his audience to perform, and that he has to bring out a certain "Universe" of desire for that purpose. We have traced the steps to the forming of the motive, and the presentation to consciousness of the idea of a certain movement that we can and intend to perform. This presentation "*suggests*" the movement,

prompts the action of the body by "*imitation*" of previous movements. But there may be difficulties and obstacles in the way. There may be nervous or muscular weaknesses. The golfer wills to hit the ball with a certain swing in a certain direction, but misses it altogether. Children play a game where everyone is to pay forfeit if he moves, whispers, laughs, or sneezes. Everyone determines not to, but generally someone breaks out. These are involuntary impulses. They have readier access to the motor nerve centres; they are physiologically stronger than the more purely psychological impulses of an act of will. And this constant breaking-in of the involuntary accounts for many complete and powerful volitions failing to issue in action. Professor Stout quotes the example of a soldier secretly storming a height in the dark. He feels a tickling in the nose, but decides not to sneeze. All the grounds of his own safety, his children, his comrades, the success of the venture, devotion to his general, his country, his duty—all these desires create a powerful dominant "Universe"; but he knows he is going to sneeze, judges so, etc., and finally does so. But that does not affect the

Involuntary impulses.

volition as such. A man wills to light a match, and strikes it, but the top comes off. He, however, did not know the top would come off. All these difficulties are external to conscious processes. They do not concern us when dealing with mental conflicts and decisions, expect to recognize that

> "The best-laid schemes o' mice and men
> Gang aft agley."

And Professor Stout quotes other difficulties more subtle and still more important for us to remember.

A man may be offered a glass of liquor. He declines on the score of being now an abstainer. As he is pressed, the "Universe" of duty to his health, his prospects, his family, his own honour, etc., dominates, and he wills not to do it; and yet by force of habit, almost mechanically, he drinks it before he realizes fully what he is doing. So a craving for opium may be so powerful that each act of taking it upsets all the volition based upon the whole "Universe" of a man's higher and nobler life, a "Universe" that has predominated for a lifetime. Thus may the *involuntary* physiological im-

pulses issue in action in spite of volition. But this struggle is with something outside the mental conflict of desires. It is a struggle to take note of, but the only part the orator can take in it is that of strengthening the volition. And much can be done in that direction once a clear, definite choice amongst conflicting desires has taken place; once the higher "Universe" has triumphed, and become a settled volition, then the will can be buttressed and established. Professor Stout takes the illustration of a decision to read a paper at a congress some months ahead. Once the decision is definitely made, all arrangements of holidays, home affairs, etc., are subordinated to this. His reading, leisure hours, financial matters, etc., are directed towards that end, until by a cumulative process the decision to go becomes so established that it is almost impossible to draw back. Thus are *habits* of desire, will, and conduct formed, and these make up *character*, and in certain characters certain "Universes" of desire can be expected to exist. But this leads us to the immense background of all conduct, the ethical ether in which we move and have our being. All the hidden forces of

Habits and character.

heredity, tradition, environment, and civilization, are involved in this background.

When the orator contemplates this, he can only declare, with the great Apostle of the Gentiles: "For we wrestle not against flesh and blood, but against principalities, against powers, against the rulers of the darkness of this world."

Sufficient material has, however, been obtained in this first rough winnowing of the wealthy yield of psychology to supply food for much reflection to the serious student of the art of oratory.

Summary.

Retracing our steps, and working backwards from the point that we have reached, and using the terms that the context explains, it is possible to summarize the whole matter as follows: After allowing for the INVOLUNTARY IMPULSES and their counteracting influences, ACTION must be assumed to follow by IMITATION of previous movements, SUGGESTED by the PRESENTATION to CONSCIOUSNESS of the IDEA of a movement that we BELIEVE can bring about the action. The PRESENTATION depends on the strength of the MOTIVE. The STEPS leading up to the creation of the motive are all

those that have been traced from the elementary processes of assimilation and discrimination to the complex working of "Universes" of desire.

There, in that summary, the orator has in a nutshell the answer to the question that confronts him: How can I move a man to act in the direction I desire? The secret lies in the SUGGESTION. As at the launching of a ship, the orator removes certain old supports, lays the well-greased slips, applies pressures here and there; and the final "suggestion" is just the last coaxing push that sets the act afloat upon the sea of conduct.

Any mistake may foul the launch, and the failures are many and sad.

The great orator is a great artist. He is one of the wizards, and he finds his power, like every other artist, in the magic circle of suggestion. As the dramatist, by his representation in action of personality and circumstance, leads the beholder inwardly to approve and disapprove of conduct, and thus be judge unto his own self, and go home to think and act differently, though perhaps unconscious of difference; and as the musician and painter

The orator an artist.

in even more subtle ways work upon conscience and character, so does the orator.

Whether the would-be orator be learned or unlearned, cultured or uncultured, he must cultivate his craft, develop his art, and learn as a practitioner, by constant observation and experiment. To move the multitude, to restrain the mob, to mould character, to be general of the forces of society that elevate the race—here is room and verge enough for the consummate skill of the most ambitious artist.

CHAPTER IV

LOGIC

A STUDY of logic is helpful to the orator. Deductive logic, or that dealing with syllogistic reasoning, helps in a general and indirect way to emphasize the danger of ambiguity and fallacy due to a careless use of words and expressions. It tends to bring the mind into an attitude of precision. It teaches what are legitimate or illegitimate conclusions. It cultivates the habit of analyzing statements, of separating them into their component parts, and of so dissecting them that fallacy is laid bare. The common fallacies are learnt, and the knowledge of them gives the power to detect fallacy in one's own composition as well as in that of others.

Uses of formal logic.

No direct application of formal logic in the form of special rules or principles for the orator

can be reproduced here. The fallacies will be dealt with later. The question of precision in word and statement will be treated at length in the chapter on Composition.

Uses of inductive logic.

Inductive logic is of more direct practical value to the orator, as it is to science generally; it discusses the principles of method and investigation. The orator would find it interesting and definitely beneficial to the development of his art to study a standard textbook like Welton's "Manual of Logic," in which the various views of ancient and modern writers are clearly and compactly set forth. A study of induction has an indirect psychological effect on the mind. It trains one in the scientific processes of investigating different subjects, and how to recognize the proper relation and order of details and principles respectively.

For the orator there are certain points of direct practical interest, and it may be helpful if they are set forth here in a convenient form. The reader will observe that this purpose is achieved mainly by quotations from Mill's "Logic." Mill was the great exponent of induction; his style is clear, and explicit, and interesting. Some of his views on logic are

Mill's "Logic."

not generally accepted to-day; but the portions quoted here represent the views of most logicians, and they have never been excelled for clearness and style. More important still, these portions are the most fruitful in hints and suggestions for the student of the art of oratory.

Professor De Morgan, in his "Budget of Paradoxes," gives a compact and complete statement of the method of induction as it is understood to-day:

Value of hypothesis.

"Modern discoveries have not been made by large collections of facts, with subsequent discussion, separation, and resulting deduction of a truth thus rendered perceptible. A few facts have suggested an *hypothesis*, which means a *supposition*, proper to explain them. The necessary results of this supposition are worked out, and then, and not till then, other facts are examined to see if these ulterior results are found in Nature. The trial of the hypothesis is the special object, prior to which the hypothesis must have been started, not by rule, but by that sagacity of which no description can be given, precisely because the very owners of it do not act under laws perceptible

to themselves. The inventor of hypotheses, if pressed to explain his method, must answer, as did Zerah Colburn, when asked for his mode of instantaneous calculation. When the poor boy had been bothered for some time in this manner, he cried out in a huff: 'God put it into my head, and I can't put it into yours.' Wrong hypotheses rightly worked from have produced more useful results than unguided observation."

The logical and psychological order.

Readers will see that the arrangement of an exposition in this scientific order coincides with the psychological method outlined in the earlier chapters.

A few introductory facts are mentioned as *prima facie* evidence; then the statement of the aim or the principle to be expounded or proved is made; then an indication is given of what ought logically to be the consequences of such a statement when worked out to its details. Then the actual particulars are compared with those hypothetical details, and if agreement or difference, as the case may be, is established, the exposition or proof is shown to be complete. The genius of the orator, like that of the inventor described by De

Morgan, lies in his power of conceiving the generalization or hypothesis. Men of less ability see and handle the same facts; but they remain very much of the same interest and significance. Genius comes, with its piercing eye, and sees a new order in them; and out of the jumble a new set of circumstances—new theory, or new point of view, with all the consequences that come in its train—is called into being, to the astonishment and discomfiture of the opponent, and to the delight and profit of the friend.

The two great powers of exposition are—(1) the power of making new or hypothetical generalizations, (2) the power of logical and psychological method in placing the exposition of the generalization effectively before others. Generalization.

How can those powers be developed? Let us see what answer logic can help us to give.

First of all as to the power of generalization, which De Morgan calls "that sagacity of which no description can be given." It is a "sagacity" that must in the main be inherent in the individual. It is largely in this sense that the great orator is "born, not made," just as is the great poet or inventor or

scientist. The great preacher works upon the same material of revelation and Holy Writ as the indifferent preachers, and the same bearing of them upon the calls of daily life; but he sees generalizations not observed by the others, however diligent they may be. So does the great lawyer "spot" the principle or hypothesis that disentangles the knots of evidence. The great politician looks upon the same facts and statistics as his fellows, but he creates and dominates policy with his generalizations.

Everyone marvels at the simplicity of a certain great invention, and wants to know why he had not thought of it; so with the master-generalization, charming and convincing in its simplicity—everyone declares that that is what he has been thinking all along. It is quite true that no study or practice can put anyone into the possession of the faculty; but the faculty can be developed, the sagacity can be trained to higher efficiency, and the moderate ability of the ordinary man can be raised by practice very near to genius.

Before proceeding to develop this, it is desirable that one part of the quotation of De Morgan's should be attended to, viz.—

"Wrong hypotheses rightly worked from have produced more useful results than unguided observation." Use of wrong hypotheses.

One remarkable illustration of the usefulness of working from wrong hypotheses is that of Kepler's theory of the universe. Kepler started an hypothesis, worked it out, and discovered that it did not yield the particulars actually found in Nature. Then he started another hypothesis, which was followed by the same labour and the same result. So he went on working out and rejecting nineteen hypotheses, one after another, before he arrived at the one that satisfied the necessary conditions of experience, and could be formulated into the great theory that revolutionized our knowledge of astronomy and all the arts that depend upon it.

Does not the great orator frequently do something of the kind?

He has to make a statement upon certain facts, or a case from certain evidence. He sketches—some do it mentally, some on paper—a certain line of treatment, which is worked out so as to contain all the pertinent points. Then he rejects the whole as an unsatisfactory

line. He sketches another, and another, until at last he has "hit" upon a line that satisfies him. In the early sketches new ideas were formed, suggestions of new facts arose, new dangers and weaknesses were revealed, and so, when finally he had fixed upon his line of treatment, he was surprised to find himself better off for effective points than he had thought possible.

Often in critical junctures have great politicians or great lawyers taken the hypothetical case of the other side and worked it out in full detail, so that they might the better know how to anticipate or how to attack the opponent's case.

It is a good device sometimes for a speaker to take the principle, or theory, or statement, of the other side, and, using it as an hypothesis, to work it out in detail, showing how it breaks down and becomes ridiculous in its details or application to facts. This method of the *reductio ad absurdum* is a frequent device of the lawyers; and many a case that could not be won by positive advocacy is won by destroying the case for the other side. The custom of the English law that the accused is

to be deemed innocent until he has been proved guilty tends to encourage this method. If the case for the prosecution can be broken down, then the defence has succeeded. There is no call for establishing the positive innocence of the prisoner.

Now for the first point: How can the native capacity for hypotheses be developed? A capacity is developed in every art by practice. The more the inventor practises looking for certain things, the more quick is he to see them. The psychological explanation of mental content, and how assimilation makes new discrimination possible, may be recalled in this connection. How the untrained observer falls into error may be illustrated by a passage which Welton quotes from Whewell: "A vague and loose mode of looking at facts, very easily observable, left men for a long time under the belief that a body ten times as heavy as another falls ten times as fast; that objects immersed in water are always magnified, without regard to the form of the surface; that the magnet exerts an irresistible force; that crystal is always found associated with ice—and the like. These and many others are

The faculty of observation.

examples how blind and careless men may be, even in observation of the plainest and commonest appearances; and they show us that the mere faculties of perception, although constantly exercised upon innumerable objects, may long fail in leading to any exact knowledge."

Such superficial and clumsy observation is constantly made of historical, social, and political phenomena. The incompetent lawyer sees the wrong and useless features of the evidence, and makes a bad case. But much of the error arising from mal-observation or non-observation is due to the personal factor. The orator is in constant danger, when preparing his statement, of being blinded by his own prejudices or desires. In selecting and rejecting points and epithets, he should be conscious of the different sides, conscious of the real truth which he has to expound, or explain, or avoid. Whatever the object of the statement—whether to make the best of a bad case for a prisoner, to rouse passion against a political injustice, or to hold the mirror of true religion against the cherished practices of the age—the orator should be dis-

passionate in preparation, and should first of all approach the facts in the mood of the true investigator. That mood can be illustrated by another splendid passage from Whewell:

The mood of the true investigator.

"But if it be an advantage for the discoverer of truth that he be ingenious and fertile in inventing hypotheses which may connect the phenomena of Nature, it is indispensably requisite that he be diligent and careful in comparing his hypotheses with the facts, and ready to abandon his invention as soon as it appears that it does not agree with the course of actual occurrences. This constant comparison of his own conceptions and suppositions with observed facts under all aspects forms the leading employment of the discoverer; this candid and simple love of truth, which makes him willing to suppress the most favourite production of his own ingenuity as soon as it appears to be at variance with realities, constitutes the first characteristic of his temper. He must have neither the blindness which cannot nor the obstinacy which will not perceive the discrepancy of his fancies and his facts. He must allow no indolence, or partial views, or self-complacency, or delight

in seeming demonstration, to make him tenacious of the schemes which he devises, any further than they are confirmed by their accordance with Nature. The framing of hypotheses is, for the inquirer after truth, not the end, but the beginning of his work. Each of his systems is invented, not that he may admire it and follow it into all its consequences, but that he may make it the occasion of a course of action, experiment, and observation; and if the results of this process contradict his fundamental assumptions, however ingenious, however symmetrical, however elegant, his system may be, he rejects it without hesitation. He allows no natural yearning for the offspring of his own mind to draw him aside from the higher duty of loyalty to his sovereign, Truth; to her he not only gives his affections and his wishes, but strenuous labour and scrupulous minuteness of attention."

The orator who studies the facts that he has generally to deal with in that spirit, and thus knows the truth, knows also the various fallacies. The preacher who approaches his great task objectively in this way would bring much more practical messages to his people than by

allowing his own mental idiosyncrasies to breed empty phrases. The lawyer would be armed *cap-à-pie* by such a practice of investigation for fighting the battle of his client, and the politician likewise for his cause.

Methodical exposition.

Now we may pass on to the second point: The power of methodical exposition. How far can a study of logic or of other rules assist in this? Mill puts the art of observing details thus, and also deals with arrangement:

"True it is that in the case of the practical inquirer, who is endeavouring to ascertain facts, not for the purposes of science, but for those of business, such, for instance, as the advocate or the judge, the chief difficulty is one in which the principles of induction will afford him no assistance. It lies not in making his inductions, but in the selection of them; in choosing, from among all general propositions ascertained to be true, those which furnish marks by which he may trace whether the given subject possesses or not the predicate in question. In arguing a question of doubtful fact before a jury, the general propositions or principles to which the advocate appeals are mostly in themselves sufficiently trite and assented to

as soon as stated; his skill lies in bringing his case under those propositions or principles, in calling to mind such of the known or received maxims of probability as admit of application to the case in hand, and selecting from among them those best adapted to his object. Success is here dependent on natural or acquired sagacity, aided by knowledge of the particular subject and of subjects allied with it. Invention, though it can be cultivated, cannot be reduced to rule; there is no science which will enable a man to bethink himself of that which will suit his purpose. But when he has thought of something, science can tell him whether that which he has thought of will suit his purpose or not."

Data improved by better observation.

Mill's remarks on probabilities or the calculation of chances are interesting: "It is obvious, too, that, even when the probabilities are derived from observation and experiment, a very slight improvement in the data, by better observations or by taking into fuller consideration the special circumstances of the case, is of more use than the most elaborate application of the calculus to probabilities founded on the data in their previous state of

inferiority. The neglect of this obvious reflection has given rise to misapplications of the calculus of probabilities which have made it the real opprobrium of mathematics. . . . And everyone knows that in the mode of performing it one intellect differs immensely from another. It is the essence of the act of observing, for the observer is not he who merely sees the thing which is before his eyes, but he who sees what parts that thing is composed of. To do this well is a rare talent. One person from inattention, or attending only in the wrong place, overlooks half of what he sees, confounding it with what he imagines or with what he infers; another takes note of the kind of all circumstances, but, being inexpert in estimating their degree, leaves the quantity of each vague and uncertain; another sees indeed the whole, but marks such an awkward division of it into parts, throwing things into one mass which require to be separated, and separating others which might more conveniently be considered as one, that the result is much the same, sometimes even worse than if no analysis had been attempted at all. It would be possible to point out what

qualities of mind and modes of mental culture fit a person for being a good observer; that, however, is a question, not of logic, but of theory of education in the most enlarged sense of the term. There is not properly an art of observing. There may be rules of observing, but these, like rules for inventing, are properly instructions for the preparation of one's own mind, for putting it into the state in which it will be most fitted to observe or most likely to invent. They are, therefore, essentially rules of self-education, which is a different thing from logic. They do not teach how to do the thing, but how to make ourselves capable of doing it. They are an art of strengthening the limbs, not an art of using them. . . .

"On the subject of juries or other tribunals, some mathematicians have set out from the proposition that the judgment of any one judge or juryman is at least in some small degree more likely to be right than wrong, and have concluded that the chance of a number of persons concurring in a wrong verdict is diminished the more the number is increased; so that if the judges are only made sufficiently

numerous, the correctness of the judgment may be reduced almost to certainty. . . . I remark only the fallacy of reasoning from a wide average to cases necessarily differing greatly from any average. It may be true that, taking all causes one with another, the opinion of any one of the judges would be oftener right than wrong; but the argument forgets that in all but the more simple cases, in all cases in which it is really of much consequence what the tribunal is, the proposition might probably be reversed, besides which the cause of error, whether arising from the intricacy of the case or from some common prejudice or mental infirmity, if it acted upon one judge would be extremely likely to affect all the others in the same manner, or at least a majority, and thus render a wrong instead of a right decision more probable, the more the number was increased."

Real and false analogies.

Again, some of Mill's remarks on analogy are worth quoting. Defining analogy as "resemblance of relations," he proceeds: "If it be argued that a nation is most beneficially governed by an assembly elected by the people, from the admitted fact that other associations for a common purpose, such as

joint stock companies, are best managed by a committee chosen by the parties interested; this, too, is an argument from analogy in the preceding sense, because its foundation is, not that a nation is like a joint stock company, or Parliament like a board of directors, but that Parliament stands in the same *relation* to the nation in which a board of directors stands to a joint stock company. Now, in an argument of this nature there is no inherent inferiority of conclusiveness. Like other arguments from resemblance, it may amount to nothing, or it may be a perfect and conclusive induction. The circumstance in which the two cases resemble may be capable of being shown to be the *material* circumstance; to be that on which all the consequences necessary to be taken into account in the particular discussion depend. In the example last given, the resemblance is one of relation, the fundamental relations being the management by a few persons of affairs in which a much greater number are interested along with them. Now, some may contend that this circumstance, which is common to the two cases, and the various consequences which follow from it, have the

chief share in determining all the effects which make up what we term good or bad administration. If they can establish this their argument has the force of a vigorous induction, if they cannot they are said to have failed in proving the analogy between the two cases—a mode of speech which implies that when the analogy can be proved the argument founded on it cannot be resisted."

Again, Mill on approximate generalizations: "The proposition 'Most judges are inaccessible to bribes' would probably be found true of Englishmen, Frenchmen, Germans, North Americans, and so forth; but if on this evidence alone we extended the assertion to Orientals, we should step beyond the limits, not only of place but of circumstances, within which the fact had been observed, and should let in possibilities of the absence of the determining causes, or the presence of counteracting ones which might be fatal to the approximate generalization.

Approximately true for individuals; absolutely true for masses.

"Again, let the question be whether most Scotchmen can read. We may not have observed or received the testimony of others respecting a sufficient number and variety of

Scotchmen to ascertain this fact; but when we consider that the cause of being able to read is having been taught it, another mode of determining the question presents itself, namely, by inquiring whether most Scotchmen have been sent to schools where reading is effectively taught." Further: "So far as regards the direct application of an approximate generalization to an individual instance, this question presents no difficulty. If the proposition 'Most A are B' has been established by a sufficient induction as an empirical law, we may conclude that any particular A is B with a probability proportioned to the preponderance of the number of affirmative instances over the number of exceptions.

"There is a case in which approximate propositions, even without our taking note of the conditions under which they are not true, if individual cases, are yet for the purposes of science universal ones, namely, in the inquiries which relate to the properties, not of individuals, but of multitudes.

"For the statesman it is generally enough to know that *most* persons act or are acted upon in a particular way, since his speculations and

his practical arrangements refer almost exclusively to cases in which, the whole community, or some large portion of it, is acted upon at once, and in which, therefore, what is done or felt by *most* persons determines the result produced by or upon the body at large. He can get on well enough with approximate generalizations on human nature, *since what is true approximately of all individuals is true absolutely of all masses.* And even when the operations of individual men have a part to play in his deductions, as when he is reasoning of kings or other single rulers, still, as he is providing for indefinte duration, involving an indefinite succession of such individuals, he must in general both reason and act as if what is true of most persons were true of all."

What is clearness of conception?

The bearing of observation on clearness is important: "It is not, however, necessary, in order to have clear ideas, that we should know all the common properties of the things which we class together. That would be to have our conception of the class complete as well as clear. It is sufficient if we never class things together without knowing exactly why we do so, without having ascertained exactly what

agreements we are about to include in our conception, and if, after having thus fixed our conception, we never vary from it, never include in the class anything which has not those common properties, nor exclude from it anything which has. A clear conception means a determinate conception, one which does not fluctuate, which is not one thing to-day and another to-morrow, but remains fixed and invariable, except when from the progress of our knowledge or the correction of some error we consciously add to it or alter it. A person of clear ideas is a person who always knows in virtue of what properties his classes are constituted, what attributes are counted by his general names. As the clearness of our conceptions depends chiefly on the *carefulness* and *accuracy* of our observing and comparing faculties, so their appropriateness, or, rather, the chance we have of hitting upon the appropriate conception in any case, mainly depends on the *activity* of the same faculties. He who by habit grounded on sufficient natural aptitude has acquired a readiness in accurately observing and comparing phenomena will perceive so many more agreements, and will per-

ceive them so much more rapidly than other people, that the chances are much greater of his perceiving in any instance the agreement on which the important consequences depend."

This view is further developed by Mill in the chapter (iv.) on Requisites of Language, which would well repay careful reading. One extract must suffice here: "The doctrine of the Coleridge School, that the language of any people among whom culture is of old date is a sacred deposit, the property of all the ages, and which no age should consider itself empowered to alter, borders indeed, as thus expressed, on an extravagance; but it is grounded on a truth frequently overlooked by that class of logicians who think more of having a clear than of having a comprehensive meaning, and who perceive that every age is adding to the truths which it has received from its predecessors, but fail to see that a counter-process of losing truths already possessed is also constantly going on, and requiring the most sedulous attention to counteract it. Language is the depository of the accumulated body of experience to which all former ages have contributed their part, and which is the inheritance of all yet to come. Language.

It may be good to alter the meaning of a word, but it is bad to let any part of the meaning drop. To be qualified to define the name, we must know all that has ever been known of the properties of the class of objects which are or originally were denoted by it. For if we give it a meaning according to which any proposition will be false which has ever been generally held to be true, it is incumbent on us to be sure that we know and have considered all which those who believed the proposition understood by it."

The above passages explain the principles of investigation and explanation which are common to all pursuits of knowledge. Along those lines the orator must work when handling the material of his speeches. But when he has established to his own satisfaction the master-generalizations, and has in arriving at them seen, and having seen decided what particulars are relevant to the establishing of the generalizations, then he is in a position to consider the problem of presenting the matter to his audience.

He is now able to select the most telling particulars from the mass. In the choice of the

particulars he is guided by the psychological demands; certain particulars make a more direct appeal to certain emotions than others. Once the orator has a complete clear logical grip of a logical arrangement, as described above, then the directness, simplicity and other qualities of style are all possible. When the whole subject lies before him as clear as a landscape under the light of noon, he can put it before his hearers in the true psychological order, and can in doing that select such of the details as will achieve the effect he desires. Qualities of style.

Without such a logical achievement by the orator, there must in exposition of necessity be turbidity of thought, and consequently lameness and a lack of the essential qualities of style.

There is one other service that a study of logic can render to the orator. It can instruct him as to the main fallacies of reasoning. An acquaintance with these fallacies puts him on his guard against committing them, and gives him an even more direct practical benefit than that, viz., the capacity for detecting the fallacies in his opponent's arguments and of exposing them.

The fallacies were classified long ago by Fallacies.

Aristotle, and that classification has been amended from time to time; but substantially the whole history of science and language has been influenced by that early and valuable classification. Many of them deal with ambiguity and equivocation of word or sentence, and, as they have been treated elsewhere, no purpose can be served by burdening these pages with the Latin or Greek names for them. One of the old standard examples is the argument: What you bought yesterday you ate to-day. You bought raw meat yesterday. Therefore you ate raw meat to-day.

If the first statement, or major premise, were "The kind of meat," etc., then there might be a valid conclusion; but the question of rawness or other quality of the meat is not relevant at all to the major premise.

Another of the minor fallacies is that of asking several questions in the form of a single question—*e.g.*, "When did you leave off beating your wife?"

Begging the question.

One of the best-known fallacies is that of "begging the question," or *petitio principii*. Aristotle indicated five forms of it: (1) When we assume the thing that we have to prove;

(2) when we assume a universal proposition which already includes the particular form of conclusion that we pretend to establish; (3) when we assume a particular form of the universal conclusion that we pretend to draw from it; (4) by assuming piece by piece the conclusion that we have to prove; (5) by assuming a proposition that implicates of necessity the proposition to be proved.

Mill says: "The most effectual way, in fact, of exposing a *petitio principii*, when circumstances allow of it, is by challenging the reasoner to prove his premisses, which if he attempts to do, he is necessarily driven into arguing in a circle. It is not uncommon for thinkers, and those not of the lowest description, to be led even in their own thoughts, not, indeed, into formally proving each of two propositions from the others, but into admitting propositions which can only be so proved. And the tendency to mistake mutual coherency for truth, to trust one's safety to a strong chain, though it has no point of support, is at the bottom of much which, when reduced to the strict forms of argumentation, can exhibit itself no otherwise than as reasoning in a circle.

A proposition would not be admitted by any person in his senses as a corollary from itself unless it were expressed in language which made it seem different. One of the commonest modes of so expressing it is to present the proposition itself in abstract terms as a proof of the same proposition expressed in concrete language. This is a very frequent mode, not only of pretended proof, but of pretended explanation. The words Nature and Essence are grand instruments of this mode of begging the question, as in the well-known argument of the scholastic theologians, that the mind thinks always, because the *essence* of the mind is to think."

None of the modes of assuming what should be proved are in more frequent use than what are termed by Bentham "question-begging appellatives," names which beg the question under the disguise of stating it. The most potent of these are such as have a laudatory or vituperative character.

Irrelevant conclusion.

Another fallacy is that known as *ignoratio elenchi*, called by Archbishop Whately the "fallacy of irrelevant conclusion." Examples given by him are, "Instead of proving that this

prisoner has committed an atrocious fraud, you prove that the fraud he is accused of is atrocious; instead of proving (as in the well-known tale of Cyrus and the two coats) that the taller boy had a right to force the other boy to exchange coats with him, you prove that the exchange would have been advantageous to both; instead of proving that the poor ought to be relieved in this way rather than in that, you prove that the poor ought to be relieved; instead of proving that the irrational agent, whether a brute or a madman, can never be deterred from any act by apprehension of punishment, as, for instance, a dog from sheep-biting by fear of being beaten, you prove that the beating of one dog does not operate as an *example* to other dogs, etc.

"It is evident that *ignoratio elenchi* may be employed as well for the apparent refutation of your opponent's proposition as for the apparent establishment of your own; for it is substantially the same thing to prove what was not denied, or to disprove what was not asserted. The latter practice is not less common, and it is more offensive, because it frequently amounts to a personal affront in

attributing to a person opinions, etc., which he, perhaps, holds in abhorrence. Thus, when in a discussion one party vindicates, on the ground of general expediency, a particular instance of resistance to government in a case of intolerable oppression, the opponent may gravely maintain 'that we ought not to do evil that good may come'—a proposition which, of course, has never been denied, the point in dispute being 'whether resistance in this particular case were doing evil or not; or, again, by way of disproving the assertion of the right of private judgment in religion, one may hear a grave argument to prove that it is impossible everyone can be *right in his judgment.*'"

Argumentum ad hominem.

A special form of the *elenchi* is the *argumentum ad hominem*, where the defending barrister with no case abuses the plaintiff's solicitor or where a measure is objected to because the statesman introducing it had at one time been against it.

Those are the main fallacies that the orator will meet in the course of his life. They are so frequent, so often hidden by verbiage, that only the trained eye can detect them. When they

are detected, the speaker has the opportunity of scoring effectively off his opponent by exposing the illogical and fallacious character of his statement. In avoiding them the speaker escapes the possibility of discomfiture at the hands of an opponent whose knowledge and skill may enable him to discover these fallacies. Very often is a body of men influenced by the subtle art of a skilful advocate, and if the speaker can lay bare the fallacy that the men did not detect he achieves one of the greatest purposes of his art. Sophistry was pursued by Socrates with his relentless interrogations, but he did not kill sophistry. Everywhere where men congregate, and where there is discourse about life and its problems, there sophistry may be seen actively at work. She is Hydra-headed, and the orator needs the courage and skill of Perseus to conquer her and to win a settled triumph for Truth.

Sophistry.

CHAPTER V

COMPOSITION

UNDER this head we have to consider a few rules of style that affect the clearness and sequence of thought, and under the head of Figures of Speech we shall deal with what more especially affects imagination and feeling.

If it could be safely assumed that every reader had been through a systematic course of English composition in school or college, then this section might be omitted; but it is only very recently that such a course has become part of the regular curriculum, and the textbooks that set forth the principles in pedagogic form, with suitable exercises, are almost all comparatively new productions.

To those textbooks, and especially to the exercises contained in them, the serious student, anxious to improve his uncultivated

style, is referred. Here the main principles and rules will be merely summarized in the form of a practical synopsis.

It is necessary to recall the essential process of enlightening the understanding. The point was that the whole outline of a description or argument should come first, and then a systematic filling in of detail upon detail. When this is applied to the detached consideration of the order and arrangement of words, it is usually described as the "principle of unity." Unity. The reader can best understand what the principle is if he (1) takes a complete narrative work, and, after reading it, writes a summary statement of the subject-matter so that, taken clause by clause, the statement shows how the subject-matter of the different chapters has been built into a unified complete structure; (2) takes one chapter at a time, and shows in a similar way how the paragraphs make up the unity of the chapter; (3) takes some paragraphs and shows how the sentences make for the unity of the paragraph, and (4) takes some of the longer sentences and shows how the clauses make for the unity of the sentence: then the meaning of unity will be understood.

Everything that does not directly help in setting forth the theme is to be strictly avoided. In the paragraph, one section of the subject-matter alone is to be dealt with. In the sentence, two common faults are to be avoided: (*a*) that of putting into a simple sentence miscellaneous or irrelevant statements; (*b*) that of overcrowding a sentence with details that would stand better in separate sentences. When the unity of any part of a composition is broken, whether it be sentence, paragraph, chapter, or general plan of the whole, there must inevitably ensue some disjointing of the ideas, and consequently some degree of mental confusion for the reader or hearer.

Value of constant practice.

It would be well for the most accomplished orator to keep his mind in training for handling his speeches in accordance with this fundamental law of unity. The athlete has to be regularly performing exercises in order to keep in form for racing or rowing or jumping. The pianist or vocalist has to be daily at scales and exercises to keep in form for producing the masterpieces. So should the orator, by definite exercises, keep his brain in trim for great efforts. They may be exercises

he performed at school, but he cannot afford to drop them; he must needs keep at them like the athlete or artiste, and just as the athlete cannot keep fit for rowing by merely rowing, or the artiste maintain his skill for playing Beethoven by merely practising Beethoven, so the orator cannot be at his best by merely making speeches.

Exercises.

So far as this capacity for casting his subject-matter into the form of unity demanded by psychological processes goes, the exercises are in themselves interesting and delightful. Plenty of exercises in the application of the principle of unity can be found in précis-writing, or in making prose versions or paraphrases of plays and poems.

More definite exercises can be obtained in attempts to summarize in outline the substance of a portion of history or description, novel, or play; and having fixed definitely the unifying theme of the work thus summarized, a précis of it may be written out. Delightful practice can be got from paraphrases of short selections of poetry, commencing with a few lines that set out the main theme, and an outline which shows how the different images,

etc., bring out that theme, throw it into bolder relief, or fill it out; to be followed by a prose version, adopting the best order for the purpose of bringing out the main theme, not necessarily in the original order of the poem.

Having said this much about the governing principle of method in composition, we pass to what is termed the first quality of style—lucidity or clearness.

Part I.—Clearness.

No composition can be effective for any purpose unless it is understood, and it must be understood by those to whom it is addressed. The ideal will be a style so pellucid that the most dull or prejudiced hearers cannot find any ambiguity in the language, but are practically compelled to understand the statements exactly as the writer intended them to be understood, immediately, and almost in spite of themselves.

That ideal is very rarely attained. Human vocabularies and phraseology are very clumsy and imperfect media for conveying thought. The speaker means one thing, and the hearer understands another. Thus it is that reformers have suffered from ambiguity and confusion.

Perils of ambiguity.

Luther, however much he protested against the misinterpretation of his words by prejudiced clerics, found himself, contrary to his intentions, driven into separation from his Church. Socrates died a martyr to the defects of language. As we read the story of the great Founder of Christianity Himself, we see at every turn the misunderstanding and misconstructions that arose when a new evangel had to be expounded in words that stood for old things. How many shelves of ancient tomes still testify to the centuries of wrangling over words and their meanings by warring sects and militant theologians? A little reflection upon recent events in any department of life will supply the student with ample illustrations of this influence of ambiguities and equivocation upon our daily controversies. Marvellous indeed would be the change if every phrase were understood exactly as its framer meant it to be understood. But that ideal awaits the millennium. Meanwhile we may profitably discuss a few simple practical rules for reducing the defects as much as possible. Such rules may be prefaced by the remark that clearness of composition is dependent upon clearness of

Clearness of thought.

thought. Ideas must be clear, and be cogently arranged in the mind of the speaker, before they can be expressed clearly for others. The thought processes have been dealt with; but it is of interest to note here that some psychologists maintain that most thought processes are impossible without the aid of language. Two canons, too often forgotten because they are so obvious, must be laid down here: (1) That practice in putting difficult things clearly into words will train the mind to habits of thinking clearly; (2) that the capacity for patiently meditating and turning a thing round in the mind until all sides of it have been clearly seen is essential to clearness of statement. The application of these two canons can be made a delightful hobby in the translation of difficult passages by one who has a competent knowledge of another language, or by expanding into prose to the fullest extent the conceptions suggested in the condensed form of poetry, and especially those in passages that are involved or cryptic in form. To turn the ideas and images over and over, to struggle for several days to put into clear, transparent prose the whole meaning

as one interprets it, and to be guided by an inexorable rule never to pass a sentence until one is quite certain that it has a plain meaning free from any ambiguity—this affords an occupation that will turn up the deep-lying treasures of poetry, and a training in lucidity of thought and expression that will develop astonishing powers in him who cares to apply himself to practice with half the zest that men train for other pursuits.

In working such exercises, the following are the rules given in summarized form, which should be carefully observed.

Rule I.—Use the Right Word in the Right Place.

Subdivision 1.—*The Right Word.*

A. *Common Blunders.*—Avoid malaprop use of the wrong words.

B. *Improprieties* to be avoided are—(*a*) confusion of words like affect, effect; continual, continuous; observation, observance; propose, purpose; most, almost; among, between; avocation, vocation; alone, only; stop,

stay; (*b*) improper uses, as, *e.g.*, "The child *aggravates* me very much."

C. *Barbarisms—i.e.*, words not generally used by educated persons—must be avoided, as, for example: "To occupate," "to enthuse." (*a*) Resuscitation of archaic terms, like—"It fortuned that it should be holden." (*b*) Unnecessary introduction of foreign words, like—"I may say *en passant*," etc.

D. *Synonyms* should be regularly studied. Useful little pocket handbooks are now available, and when working exercises the fine shades of difference between the words given in different groups should be carefully considered. This weighing of words and patient choosing is one of the most valuable habits that can be acquired.

E. *Idioms.*—A complete acquaintance with current idioms is exceedingly useful for putting things concisely and clearly. How, for instance, can the idea expressed in the idiom "cut a caper" be adequately expressed in another form? Practice in making lists of idiomatic expressions for each of a set of verbs is suggested.

Useful lists and exercises on these can be

found in any of the recently-published school books on composition.

F. *Prepositions.*—To use the proper prepositions for verbs is essential—*e.g.*,

Obliged *by*, not *for*.
Different *from*, not *to*.
Lives *at* Bath.
Lives *in* London.

Useful lists and exercises on these also can be found in the school books.

G. *Double or Illogical Uses of the Same Word* are bad—*e.g.*, "Took up his hat and took his departure." "He left me and turned to the left."

H. *Equivocal Phrases* must be avoided—*e.g.*, "The reformation of Luther." "He has a certain claim to a share."

I. *Rule as to the Use of "Who," "Which," "That."*—There is, unfortunately, an evil practice, even among the best writers and speakers, of using "that" and "which" promiscuously, without regard to any distinction. It would save a considerable amount of confusion if such a rule as that first explained by Bain were taught in the schools, and

generally followed. The rule may be stated as follows: When the subordinate clause is merely a further explanation — merely qualifies the main subject without adding any information not already contained in the main sentence—use "that"; when some fresh information is contained in the subordinate clause, use "who" for persons, and "which" for things. In the sentence "The old man was in the train that left the rails," "that" explains which train is meant. In the sentence "The old man was in the train which by losing time caused him to miss the connection," "which" adds a new fact, and is equivalent to "and it."

If "which" were used in the former sentence, the meaning, according to this rule, would be, "The old man was in the train, and the train left the rails," whereas, as the sentence stands, it is an answer to the question, "Which train was the old man in?"

Subdivision 2.—The Right Place.

A. The change in meaning due to change of position of "only," "alone," and "even," illustrates the general effect:

Only he saw his father.
He *only* saw his father.
He saw *only* his father.
He saw his *only* father.
He saw his father *only*.

Alone he saw his father.
He *alone* saw his father.
He saw *alone* his father.
He saw his father *alone*.

Even he saw his father.
He *even* saw his father.
He saw *even* his father.
He saw his father *even*.

Similarly, the effect of position is seen in horse-race, race-horse; bootblack, black boot; he bought cheap material, he bought material cheap.

B. *Reference of Pronouns.*—Pronouns must be used in positions where the reference is quite clear. Such a sentence as the following is marred by a general ambiguity: "He told the coachman that he would be the death of him,

if he did not take care what he was about, and mind what he said about him."

C. *The Laws of Priority and Proximity.*—The obscurity or ambiguity of sentences is often due to the wrong position or order of clauses.

Priority. The law of priority if always observed would prevent such defects. It may be stated as follows: "Qualifying words and phrases should immediately precede what they qualify," Bain gives an interesting justification of the law by explaining why we say "black horse." The reason is that, if the name of the concrete thing is given first—horse, for example—the image formed by the mind is likely to be wrong; probably a brown horse, as the most common, is pictured; hence, when the word "black" is added, the mental image must be unmade: the (brown) colour has to be suppressed, and the (black) inserted. This is much more strikingly true of conditional clauses: "If the main clause is stated first, the hearer conceives it unconditionally, and then he has to reshape his conception." When the phrases or clauses are long it is not convenient to adhere to the principle. Indeed, there are so many exceptions that we are not justified

in describing it as a rule. The point to note is that when the principle is observed the risk of ambiguity is small, whereas the exceptions are prolific in ambiguities.

Wherever the law of priority cannot be observed, we have to fall back upon the law of proximity, which may be stated in the form: "Qualifying words, phrases, and clauses, must be as near as possible to what they qualify." Newspapers and other periodicals frequently publish specimens of funny bits that illustrate the perils of neglecting this law. A few well-known specimens will suffice — *e.g.*, "John Smith kills pigs like his father." "It is alleged that he committed suicide in the morning papers." "Several dogs were shot in the West End." "Your present is now in the drawing-room on the mantelpiece, where we hope to see you often." "Last night I lay in a gondola on the Grand Canal, drinking it all in." Proximity.

D. *The Pronouns*, especially relative pronouns, cause the obscurity in the majority of cases, and it is a great advantage for a speaker to be able to avoid difficulties by means of alternative modes of expression. Facility in

using equivalents for relatives ought to be steadily cultivated.

The kinds of equivalents are—

1. Adjectives—*e.g.*, "A howling dog is a nuisance," for "A dog that howls."

2. Participles—*e.g.*, "People walking on the grass," for "that walk."

3. Infinitives—*e.g.*, "Welcome the first to come," for "that comes."

4. Conditional "if" clauses: "If a horse cannot jump a gate it is not useful," for "A horse that cannot jump"; etc.

In long sentences care should be exercised so that independent clauses can be kept together, and not be intermixed with parts of dependent or other independent clauses.

Rule II.—Use the Simplest Words.

A few observations are necessary to explain what this rule means. It does not necessarily mean the use of monosyllables or of words of Anglo-Saxon origin. It is put that way sometimes. But although the simplest common words of everyday conversation are usually of Anglo-Saxon origin, it does not follow that

Anglo-Saxon words.

such words are those most readily understood.

The words of King Alfred and scores of the words of Shakespeare are now obsolete. In dealing with scientific subjects like chemistry, for instance, the words most readily understood are terms that are constantly in use, although they may be of Latin or Greek origin. The rule may therefore be stated as—"Use the words that will be most readily and clearly understood by those to whom you speak."

Simplicity must be carefully distinguished from childishness. Many inexperienced speakers from town, society, or professional circles think it necessary to talk down to the working man or country labourer in childish phrase; but "childish" talk is not interesting even to children. Children like to read manly writing in the simplest language of the adult. "Robinson Crusoe," "Gulliver's Travels," Southey's "Nelson," and other favourites of childhood, were written for adults. Pedantry, slang, euphuism of the Pecksniff type, are obnoxious to any and every class of audience. True simplicity is the highest test of fitness in the orator. For many years statements appeared in books

as well as in newspapers that the simplicity of Bright's speeches was due to the fact that he patiently wrote them out and revised them several times, eliminating words that were not of simple Anglo-Saxon origin. This legend has been authoritatively denied. The phraseology and words of Bright's greatest efforts, like his regular speeches, were extempore. He thought out, outlined, and turned over and over in his mind, the matter and method, the thoughts, images, and principal epithets, and then the words came readily in the stress of delivery. Anyone who will study some of Bright's speeches will see that the percentage of long words of Latin or Greek is as high as the average in modern political speeches. The simplicity does not lie in vocabulary as such, but in the extraordinary DIRECTNESS OF EXPRESSION. Bright had to an exceptional degree, especially when roused by an exalted passion, the capacity for seeing the end, and seeing all round the subject he was speaking on. This is a mental, not a verbal, capacity. He had the vividness of mind that enabled him to deal with his subject in the true psychological order that has been explained in the earlier pages.

Bright's speeches.

Directness of expression.

Because he saw the whole so clearly, he set it plain in broad outline before his audience, and then filled in detail by detail in the natural order; so that when we look from the outside on the speech as a composition, we are astonished at the directness with which he draws his simple lines and gives us a clear-cut picture.

Exercises.

The exercises in précis and paraphrase that have been recommended above can afford practice in cultivating this faculty for simplicity. Occasionally the student may decide to concentrate on directness of expression during a series of exercises. In working the exercises it should be remembered that two things are involved: (1) A vivid mental grasp of the whole matter, and a clear perception of the essential steps and links; (2) a direct, concise, logical, connected *setting forth* of the matter.

And those two essentials have as a corollary the avoidance of—

1. Prolixity.
2. Digressions and introduction of parentheses.
3. Circumlocutory expressions.
4. Tautology.

Modern journalism, with its tendency to terseness, contrasts very favourably with the cumbrous classical construction of sentences in the prose of Hooker and Milton, and its influence on modern speeches in the direction of direct, cogent, terse statement is for good. The steadily increasing number of idioms that comes with new discoveries and enterprises is a help to brevity and pithiness. Of course repetition is occasionally necessary to ensure clearness, and the speaker has to recapitulate in order to keep the whole train of argument or events fresh in the hearer's mind. Tautology and circumlocution are also deliberately employed sometimes for purposes of humour and satire. The very fact that tautology is so frequent an element of the ludicrous emphasizes the need for avoiding it in sober statement.

Part II.—Strength.

Strength, or force, in composition presupposes clearness. Assuming that the necessary lucidity has been secured, we can discuss the methods of obtaining emphasis by variations in the order of words or clauses. And it may

be pointed out, by the way, that a regular adherence to the "laws of inversion," as it is called, which is sketched out below, helps towards clearness. A sentence is often ambiguous simply because one puts the emphasis on one part and another on some other part. The classic illustration is the Scriptural quotation "Saddle me the ass," which has three different meanings according to the distribution of the emphasis.

Rule I.—The Law of Inversion.

The normal order of words in an English sentence is, subject, predicate, object, and extension. Emphasis is got by inverting that normal order.

The most emphatic positions in the sentence are the *beginning* and the *end.* Hence the rules of inversion, or alteration of the normal order of words, may be set forth as follows:

Examples.

To emphasize the subject, move it to the *end.*

To emphasize the predicate, move it to the *beginning* or *end.*

To emphasize the object, move it to the *beginning* or *end.*

To emphasize the extension, move it to the *beginning* or *before the verb.*

To emphasize the complement, move it *before the verb.*

To emphasize an adverb or adverbial phrase, put it *first.*

To emphasize an adjective or adjectival phrase put it *after the noun.*

Rule II.—Repetition.

A frequent mode of emphasis is that of repeating—

1. An auxiliary word—*e.g.*, "In . . . in . . . in . . .," etc.
2. Repeating the same word.
3. Using a series of words of similar meaning, *e.g.*, "Weary, stale, flat, and unprofitable world."
4. Using a series of similar sentences.

Rule III.—Climax.

The arrangement of sentences in a paraphrase, and of clauses and phrases in a sentence, in such a way that the reader is led gradually, step by step, from the minor to the more important, and

finally, at the end, to the most important point, is the form of style called "climax."

It has the advantage of sustaining interest and of securing proper emphasis. But there is a danger of its becoming mechanical, pompous, and monotonous, and there is always the danger, at the end of a climax, of dropping too suddenly into an "anticlimax" that becomes ludicrous, and is technically termed "bathos."

On the other hand, the form known by contrast as "loose" has the disadvantage of discursiveness, loss of interest, and a constant tendency to ambiguity,

In a similar way, long sentences have the advantage of conveying a whole thought, whereas short sentences tend to snippets, and jerks, and starts.

But all these forms are determined by mental and objective circumstances for the orator; so, however fruitful the study of them may be for the essayist or other writer, they are not of any direct value for the speaker. The practical points that concern him have been given. Bain includes climax under figures of speech, and an illustration is quoted below.

Part III.—Figures of Speech.

The inadequacy of any human vocabulary for expressing our thoughts and feelings directly in plain words, used in their ordinary sense, is met by various "figures of speech." The aid of images and of comparisons and contrasts and suggestions is obtained, and the whole list of figures of speech is an illustration of the enormous part played by the laws of association in the communications of men. It is not only in formal original new figures coined by special ingenuity that this is to be observed, but in some of the commonest and current expressions of daily life. We say, "a dry remark," "kill time," "the kettle boils," "struck dumb": such phrases have become so familiar that they are as definite a part of our daily vocabulary as any collection of simple words out of the dictionary. Most of the idioms of a language are figurative expressions. When first used they depend upon one or other of the laws of association. Then gradually they become terms of expression as current, and as definite and single in their meaning, as the commonest words.

Idioms.

The orator is as free to use those expressions as to use the common words, and no special remarks are necessary concerning them.

The question now to be discussed—a question of the highest importance—is the use of new, more or less elaborate figures, and of figures coined specially for the purposes of oratorical effect.

The *Simile* is the most open, obvious, direct form of comparison. The word "like" or "as" is used. A metaphor is a simile with the form of comparison and the word "like" or "as" dropped, leaving the comparison to be implied in the language used. Every object of the orator is served by apt and effective similes or metaphors: Simile and metaphor.

1. To make the thing less understood clearer by comparison with that which is better understood.

2. To obtain strength or vigour of expression by comparison with that which adds to feeling.

There are very useful rules drawn up by Bain that should be observed in the selection of similes or metaphors: Rules of selection.

1. When figures of similarity are employed

to give intelligibility and clearness—that is, to aid the understanding—they must satisfy the following conditions:

(*a*) The resemblance should turn on the relevant circumstance.

(*b*) The comparison should be more intelligible to those addressed than the thing compared.

(*c*) The accompanying circumstances should not be such as to distract the mind from the real point.

2. With a view to heighten the feelings, the conditions are these:

(*a*) The figure employed should be more impressive than the original.

(*b*) The degree of elevation should be within the bounds that the hearer can tolerate.

(*c*) The similitudes should be neither obvious nor trite.

(*d*) A mere intellectual comparison should not be tendered for an emotional one.

3. To render comparison, as such, a source of pleasure, the following points must be attended to:

(*a*) Novelty, originality, or freshness, is still more requisite than in the previous case.

(*b*) There should be a harmony of feeling between the things compared, and no distasteful accompaniments.

Mixed metaphor is a common intolerable defect of style; *e.g.*, mixing metaphorical and literal expressions, and straining metaphors by dragging them out into details that are irrelevant or out of keeping with the subject or the comparison, are obvious defects, though difficult to avoid in extempore speech.

Personification—either in the lower form of representing abstractions as real things: *e.g.*, representing "time" as a "river," a "wave," a "shore," etc.; or in the higher form of giving inanimate things the qualities of living beings: *e.g.*, "*dying* lamp," "*thirsty* ground"—is a bold form of figure, and it should only be used sparingly when feeling is strong in the audience as well as in the orator's delivery. Bolder still, and even more limited as to the proper occasions of use, is apostrophe, the fervid appeal to an absent being—*e.g.*, "Judge, O ye gods, how dearly Cæsar loved him!" Personification.

The names for other figures are useful for critical purposes, but the processes have already been dealt with. They are modes of

association by contiguity. Various forms of metonymy are classified by Bain—*e.g.*, using for the thing itself (1) a sign or adjunct—*e.g.*, "the crown," "red tape"; (2) the instrument for the agent—*e.g.*, "a stroke of the pen"; (3) the container for the contained—*e.g.*, "the kettle boils"; (4) the effect for the cause—*e.g.*, "gray hairs" for "age"; (5) the person for the thing—*e.g.*, "a Bradshaw." Synecdoche substitutes a part for the thing—*e.g.*, "the canvas glows," "fifty sail," "the avenger of blood," "the Stagirite."

Modes of association.

Just as those devices that give variety and picturesqueness to style are based upon the association of things that occur together, so there are devices of contrast by means of parallels, antitheses, etc. There is often an implied or indirect contrast that can be left to the imagination of the audience; but it is necessary to state the contrast in express terms. Antithesis is therefore a common form of style—*e.g.*, "to be a blessing, and not a curse;" "men may come, and men may go, but I go on for ever." By such juxtaposition or such contradictions wonder can be excited, and other effects due to sudden

changes of feeling, such as laughter, can be obtained.

Finally there is the figure of hyperbole, where exaggeration is deliberately employed to make a matter more impressive or effective. Bain gives several reasons for the tendency to hyperbole. Hyperbole.

Strong passion magnifies what concerns it, affection enhances objects above the reality, fear exaggerates changes, hatred intensifies vices.

He notes three rules that should be observed: (1) The orator must not go beyond the limit that the hearers will admit the departure from reality; (2) the figure should be sparingly used; (3) the figures should not be too trite or commonplace.

Bain's illustration of climax is a good one: Climax.
"The common example of this figure is from the oration of Cicero against Verres. The orator, wishing to raise the indignation of the audience to the highest pitch, refrained from specifying the crime of the accused at once, and led the way up to it by successive steps: 'It is an outrage to *bind* a Roman citizen; to *scourge* him is an atrocious crime; *to put him*

to death is almost a parricide; but to CRUCIFY him—what shall I call it?' The climax is in accordance with the nature of our feelings. We are gratified at first by a small stimulation; as this palls, we must have something stronger, and to go back from a higher to a lower grade has a depressing effect. The principle of rising in this way by successive degrees applies to the sentence or period, to the paragraph, and to the entire composition. A play or a romance increases in excitement by degrees to the final catastrophe; and so ought an oration."

The use of Interrogation described in manuals of composition needs one qualification, viz., that it is dangerous where an audience may be upset by any wag who supplies a mischievous, inappropriate, or funny answer.

Exclamation, irony, and innuendo, are other essentially oratorical devices, and they should be studied closely.

CHAPTER VI

TYPES OF AUDIENCES

THERE are certain considerations for the orator arising from differences in the size and nature of audiences. Subject to the general principles of mental and moral philosophy, and the leading principles of composition, each type of audience must be handled in a special way. The expert audience.

In addressing the expert audience of one or two individuals, the speaker has to be as matter-of-fact, technical, logical, and strictly relevant, as possible. A small deputation to an employer, public man, or minister of state, has usually to lay certain facts before him, and the processes described under the head of Enlightening the Understanding, and Clearness, are the ones involved, together with the methods of natural emphasis. It is a mistake for the speaker to try to make an impression or to

wax eloquent in manner. He should allow the facts to be impressive and eloquent. The expert will bow to unanswerable fact when nothing else can move him. It must be remembered, however, that a human being is being dealt with, and it is, therefore, not enough to arrange the matter fairly tidily on paper and repeat that paper form. The problem to be consciously and openly faced is: How can these facts be best arranged to give him an idea of our point of view, and, by a skilful placing of fact after fact, get him step by step to see the matter as we see it? This is the task of the advocate before a Judge, when arguing an appeal in the House of Lords, or when dealing with Private Bills before the small Private Bill Committees of four members of one of the Houses of Parliament. Anyone who has, like the writer, had to listen in the capacity of a judge for many days to evidence and arguments for and against a case that has been prepared at enormous expense, and with months of labour and detailed care, knows how few are the lawyers who can look at a case with the eyes of the judges, and put the essential points that tell: days and days are

spent piling evidence on evidence which is so non-essential that it merely wearies the judges. Hours are spent in the argument going round and round, but never coming right down to the core of the case. There are a few, however, whom it is wonderful to watch. They swoop down like hawks, and pick the eyes right out of the prey with unerring aim and swiftness. The great advocate fixes his central point, and then puts up his side-wings, and flanks it with supports and contrasts, and drapes and lights it all up, until it is like a tableau that anyone can see the meaning of. Sometimes, of course, a touch of sentiment, and an appeal to the humanity of the individual is desirable as a stimulus at the end. Such an appeal must not be a harangue in a rhetorical form. An individual is being addressed, and he must be spoken to in the natural tones that individuals converse in. But the occasion has some formal importance, and the natural mode of address will be intensified with that concentrated force and restrained but deliberate emphasis which turns the natural into the artistic.

Class-teaching forms a whole science of pedagogy, and cannot be entered upon here. Class-teaching.

But the whole art of teaching is really the art of making things clear, and some experience in class-teaching is an exceedingly valuable training for a speaker, whether it be in a professional class in some grade of day-school, or an amateur class in a Sunday-school. The danger for the professional teacher after years of daily teaching is that he over-explains, and labours the obvious when he addresses adults.

Lectures. The school or college lecture, or addresses to small philosophical societies, drawing-room meetings, committees up to about fifty in number, boards of directors, and juries, constitute the second type to be considered. The remarks as to the individual hearer apply here with certain modifications. The speaker has to deal with a group, and so long as the units of the group listen to him as different persons with different prejudices and individual peculiarities, so long will the speaker be dealing unsatisfactorily with his audience. The group has to be fused into one *attention-mass*, so that it can be dealt with as one individual thing. Until that fusion has taken place the attempt to realize the object of the

address should be postponed. The method of obtaining the fusion has been dealt with in previous chapters. Some touch of imagination or passion, that which stirs a feeling common to the members of the group, is the means of fusion Groups of this size are the most difficult audiences to handle. They are more complex than the individual, and there is not that psychic and overpowering infection of feeling that is present in the crowd. When the group has come to learn, to render homage to a great man or a great subject, and each individual gives voluntary attention, it is one of the easiest and best of audiences ; but when there is scepticism, prejudice, or hostility, then the task of the speaker is worthy of his skill. In such small circles the power of a great voice, dramatic gestures, and sweeps of torrential eloquence, are all impossible. A knowledge of the persons addressed, their capacities and limitations ; an acute acquaintance with human nature ; mental capacity for the lucid presentation of a case, and aptness of phrase for expression, combined with that tone and manner which seems natural, but is much more than natural—those are the instruments of success.

The normal audience.

The next type of audience is the normal size and kind for oratory in the ordinary sense of the word. It includes gatherings up to five or eight hundred, church congregations, popular lecture meetings, social, industrial and philanthropic conferences, large company meetings, etc.

Here all the best art of the orator finds scope. Here are the complex conditions that he must master until, as on the keys of an organ, he can finger out the tune. He must know the people's prejudices, he must watch during the preliminary proceedings to see what manner of folk they are, and what is the general background of feeling on the subject of his address. Then he must remember that there is a special psychology and special ethics of the crowd, which includes that of the individual and something more.

The crowd laughs uproariously at the joke that the individual or small circle would contemn. The crowd is swept by great waves of emotion, and the individual who would be unmoved when alone is almost hysterical as a member of the crowd. Great reforms and religious revivals have been fought and won

with the crowds. The man who works upon a crowd is allowed a bigger brush than he who has a few people. The full mental output of intellectual energy, the full stretch of imagination, the full effect of trope and illustration, the whole power of voice and gesture, and all that expresses and moves emotion—these can be used, and are expected to be used.

There is, however, too much loudness of voice, too much violence of gesture, and too extravagant a style generally, in meetings. The art of suppression, or of concentrating force, is not practised as it should be.

Given the mental power, and the sense that one has the whole mind and heart of the crowd completely in hand, and then, with judicious self-control, all the stops of the organ of rhetoric can be manipulated with effect.

The demonstration.

The people attending a huge demonstration running to many thousands usually come together to demonstrate. The flowing tide is with the speaker. Close arguments, attention to small matters, are not wanted, and will soon lose grip of the audience. Broad principles set forth in a grand manner, and vigour, and swell are what a demonstration wants. Great

declarations of policy, the celebration of some stirring event—these call for the Miltonic strains. The orator who has acquired a wide sweep of style has his opportunity for a big oration that is not cumbered by apologetic or explanatory parentheses. It is hopeless to try to hold the attention of a demonstration to such matters as would suit a drawing-room. Boldness, strength, the manifestation of knowing what one is talking about—above all, a ringing sincerity backed by enough power of voice to give it forceful hearing—these sway the huge mass as the breeze moves the surface of the waters.

Directness, relevancy, point, are essential. The slightest confusion, prolixity, or parenthetical manner, means disaster. Voice and gesture do certainly mean much with the great crowd.

The open air.

Audiences in the open air, though smaller in size, must be attacked in a manner similar to the demonstration. Patient argument, attention to details, will not do in the open air, where there may be many distractions. Voice means much here. It did for Whitefield, who was declared by Benjamin Franklin to have

been able to make himself heard by at least 30,000 at one time.

A crowd expressing its enthusiasm by applause, and cheering, helps to bring the individuals within the "Universe" that the speaker is endeavouring to get them into. The infection of feeling, the mass of desire and purpose, gives body and strength to the desire and purpose of the individual. An individual will act as one of a crowd when he will not act alone.

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